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AIDS DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE REHABILITATION
ACT: WHEN A PHYSICIAN REFUSES TO TREAT, WHO
IS LIABLE?
INTRODUCTION
AIDS is the commonly recognized acronym for the disease called
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome. Scientists have named the
virus that causes AIDS the "human immunodeficiency virus"
(HIV). 1 The impact of HIV infection has become a major world-
wide public health issue.' The Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
estimate that by the end of 1992, the number of systemic3 AIDS
cases will reach 365,000, with an expected 80,000 newly diagnosed
cases in that year alone.' During 1992, the cost of medical care of
AIDS patients will range from $5 billion to $13 billion.' Although
AIDS began as a medical problem, it has become a legal problem of
enormous dimensions.'
One legal problem related to AIDS is that some health care prov-
iders have refused to care for persons infected with HIV out of fear
that they will contract the infection from these patients.7 Such re-
fusals raise difficult ethical and legal dilemmas.
This Comment addresses the issue of a physician's refusal to treat
an HIV-positive patient, as well as a hospital's potential liability for
refusing to treat. First, the Comment examines the nature of the
AIDS disease and the risk of occupational infection to health care
workers. Next, it addresses the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and its
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of disability in feder-
1. The virus has also been called "human T-cell lymphotrophic virus type III (HILV - 1II)"
caused by a "lymphadenopathy-associated virus (LAV)." ROBERT M. JARVIS ET AL., AIDS LAW IN
A NUTSHELL 6 (1991).
2. DONALD HJ. HERMANN & WILLIAM P. SCHURGIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF AIDS § 1:03 (1991).
3. "Systemic" is defined as "of or pertaining to the whole body, rather than to a localized area
or regional portion of the body." MOSBY'S MEDICAL & NURSING DICTIONARY 1050 (Laurence
Urdang & Helen H. Swallow eds., 1983).
4. HERMANN & SCHURGIN, supra note 2, § 1:03.
5. Id.
6. JARVIS 13T AL.. supra note 1, at 3.
7. Bernard Lo, M.D., Obligations to Care for Persons with Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 4
ISSUES L. & MED. 367 (1988).
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ally funded programs.8 The development of AIDS as a disability
under the Act is examined in this context. In order to identify
whether a hospital may be liable for the acts of its physicians, the
Comment discusses the common law doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior. The Comment then addresses vicarious liability as it applies to
hospitals, under the doctrines of respondeat superior and ostensible
agency. Additionally, it examines the applicability of respondeat su-
perior to actions brought under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. The Comment applies these areas of law to the situation in
which a physician refuses to treat a patient because the patient has
tested positive for the AIDS virus. Finally, the Comment addresses
the hospital's potential vicarious liability for the physician's actions.
This Comment will demonstrate that the parameters of the physi-
cian's and hospital's liability will depend on several factors, includ-
ing the physician's relationship with the hospital, the existence or
lack of an independent practice, and the degree of control the hospi-
tal exerts over the physician.
I. BACKGROUND
In order to understand why a health care provider may refuse to
treat an AIDS patient, it is important to understand the nature and
effects of the disease.
A. Clinical Description of AIDS
Upon entering the blood stream, the AIDS virus begins to attack
certain white blood cells (T-lymphocytes), which are an essential
part of the human immune system.9 As a result, the immune system
becomes impaired. Individuals with AIDS become susceptible to a
variety of opportunistic infections'0 and malignant conditions that
generally do not affect people who have normal resistance to
disease."
8. The Rehabilitation Act, Pub. L. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §
794), amended by Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-506, § 103(d)(2)(b), 100
Stat. 1807, 1810 (1986) and Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259, § 9, 102
Stat. 28 (1988).
9. Robert P. Wasson, Jr., Aids Discrimination Under Federal, State and Local Law After
Arline, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 221, 223 (1987).
10. An opportunistic infection is an infection caused by organisms which normally do not cause
disease in a healthy individual, but are disease causing in a host whose resistance has been weak-
ened. MosBY's MEDICAL & NURSING DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 770.
11. Wasson, supra note 9, at 223.
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HIV can be transmitted through the exchange of certain kinds of
bodily fluids.' 2 It may be contracted by: 1) sexual intercourse involv-
ing the exchange of blood, semen, or vaginal secretions; 2) sharing
unsterilized syringes; 3) receipt of donated blood, semen, breast
milk, or human organs; and 4) child birth or breast feeding of an
infant.'3 Casual contact, such as shaking hands, hugging, kissing,
sharing eating utensils, and using common bathroom facilities, will
not transmit the virus."'
Once an individual is infected, the disease may progress within
the individual in several ways: testing HIV-positive, the appearance
of symptoms, and AIDS.' 5
1. Testing HIV-Positive, But Showing No Symptoms
The majority of people who become infected develop antibodies to
the virus but do not experience any immediate symptoms.' 6 How-
ever, a number of individuals will experience a condition similar to
mononucleosis at the time they initially become infected with
HIV.'7 Those who experience some symptoms, and the majority who
never experience any symptoms, typically enter an asymptomatic
carrier state, in which evidence of the HIV infection may be found
upon laboratory testing.' 8
The length of time that an individual remains asymptomatic is
presently estimated to be seven to ten years.' 9 Following the asymp-
tomatic period, one or more symptoms will begin to appear.2 0
2. Appearance of Symptoms or AIDS-Related Complex (ARC)
ARC is a condition in which the patient tests HIV-positive but
has a specific set of clinical symptoms that are less severe than those
found in full-blown AIDS.2' Signs and symptoms of ARC include
12. JARVIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 7.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 8 (listing' common examples of casual contact that will not transmit HIV).
15. HERMANN & SCHURGIN, supra note 2, §§ 1:06-1:09.
16. Id. § 1:07.
17. Id. The symptoms accompanying this acute infection often last from 3 to 14 days and
typically consist of fever, skin eruptions, myalgias, arthralgias, malaises, swollen glands, sore
throats, gastrointestinal symptoms, and headaches. Various neurologic symptoms can be found in
conjunction with this acute stage of illness. Id.
18. Id.
19. JARVIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 15.
20. Id.
21. Some sources no longer use the term "ARC" for this transitional period. See id. (indicating
that the term has fallen into disuse).
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swollen lymph nodes, fatigue, skin rash, fever, diarrhea, night
sweats, and weight loss." Some patients also develop infections sug-
gestive of an impaired immune system that are not necessarily life-
threatening, such as oral candidiasis and herpes zoster.23
3. Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
In addition to the generalized symptoms mentioned previously, se-
rious opportunistic diseases may attack individuals with HIV be-
cause of their depressed immune systems. 4 The term "AIDS" is
reserved for individuals who have developed at least one life-threat-
ening clinical condition that is clearly linked to HIV-caused immu-
nodeficiency. 5 These include conditions such as Karposi's sarcoma
(KS), pneumocystis carnii pneumonia (PCP), and dementia. 2 Op-
portunistic infections are the major cause of death in HIV-infected
patients.27
4. Current State of the AIDS Epidemic
America's AIDS epidemic has entered what scientists call a "ma-
ture" phase: a long-term presence with a slowly shifting profile.28 In
the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the virus spread rapidly
among gay men and intravenous drug users. 29 Today, an estimated
one million living Americans carry the HIV virus.3 0 Of these indi-
viduals, 200,000 have developed full-blown AIDS, and more than
125,000 have died."1 According to rough estimates by the CDC,
50,000 or more people become infected with the virus each year. 2
On November 7, 1991, Magic Johnson, "one of the most popular
22. HERMANN & SCHURGIN, supra note 2, § 1:09.
23. Id.
24. JARVIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 16-17.
25. HERMANN & SCHURGIN, supra note 2, § 1:06.
26. Id. Karposi's sarcoma is a rare cancer of blood vessel walls which commonly appears as
skin bumps that are pink to purple and are painless. It can also cause disease in lungs and other
organs. AIDS AND THE LAW 362 (Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987). Pneumocystis pneumonia
is an unusual form of pneumonia caused by a protozoan parasite, pneumocystis carnii. Id. Demen-
tia is the deterioration of an individual's mental state and the reduction of intellectual functioning
due to infection, cancer, or other organic brain disease. Id. at 361.
27. HERMANN & SCHURGIN. supra note 2, § 1:10.
28. Erik Eckholm, More Than Inspiration Is Needed to Fight AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
1991, § 4, at 1.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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and accomplished players in basketball history," announced that he
was infected with the HIV virus and would be retiring from the Los
Angeles Lakers.3 a He was quoted as saying, "I think sometimes we
think, well, only gay people can get it - 'It's not going to happen to
me.' ... I am saying that it can happen to anybody."3 4 Magic John-
son's honest admission of his illness and his willingness to discuss it
have pleased educators and health planners. 35 Legislative leaders
who recently sought to cut AIDS education budgets are now explor-
ing ways to attack the problem more aggressively.3 6 Dr. Karen
Hein, the director of the adolescent AIDS program at Montefiore
Medical Center in the Bronx, stated, "At this point, and for the first
time, the virus has become an all-American problem."
37
Because AIDS is affecting more segments of the population and is
spreading rapidly, accessibility of medical care for persons with
AIDS is critical. An important factor related to the accessibility of
treatment is the attitude of the individual who provides that care. A
major problem confronting the medical field today involves care-giv-
ers becoming fearful of contracting the disease from patients.
B. Health Care Workers' Occupational Risk of Exposure to
HIV
In the face of the AIDS epidemic, some health care workers re-
fuse to care for HIV-positive patients for fear of becoming infected
themselves. However, according to much scientific evidence, many
health care workers are at low risk of acquiring HIV from occupa-
tional exposure to patients.38 A puncture wound caused by a con-
taminated needle constitutes the most common risk to medical
workers.'" Prospective studies indicate that the risk of seroconver-
33. Richard W. Stevenson, Magic Johnson Ends His Career, Saying He Has the AIDS Virus,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1991, at Al.
34. Id. at A1, B12.
35. Michael Specter, When AIDS Taps a Hero, His "Children" Feel Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
1991, § 1, at 1, 34.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Gregory P. Gramelspacher, M.D. & Mark Siegler, M.D., Do Physicians Have A Profes-
sional Responsibility To Care For Patients With HIV Disease?, 4 IssuEs L. & MED. 383, 390
(1988).
39. Id. at 389. Puncture wounds may occur in a variety of circumstances, such as improper
disposal of used syringes, disposal of used syringe containers which are overly full, and attempts at
recapping used syringes. See Lo, supra note 7, at 368-69.
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sion4 ° following needlestick exposures to HIV-infected patients'
blood is less than 1.0 %.'1 Studies of work-related exposures indicate
that only 0.1 % to 0.25 % of the exposures will seroconvert following
a needlestick injury, and the level of risk associated with the expo-
sure of nonintact skin or mucous membranes 2 is even less likely."3
Therefore, the occupational risk of HIV is low but still exists. The
overall risk of HIV transmission, however, for those health care
workers who are more frequently exposed to blood or other bodily
fluids is more uncertain.44 Such health care workers include persons
working in emergency rooms, delivery rooms, and operating rooms
where they are more likely to suffer needlesticks and cuts.45 Health
care workers such as general internists, psychiatrists, and adminis-
trators who do not risk needlesticks and cuts are at a much lower
risk of contracting the HIV virus.4 '
Even though occupationally acquired HIV is rare, the risk is
frightening nonetheless. If contracted, the HIV infection is most
likely fatal,"7 as there is no known vaccine or cure for the infec-
tion.48 Furthermore, precautions recommended by the CDC to re-
duce the risk of occupational HIV infection do not fully protect
against some potential routes of transmission, such as needlesticks
or cuts.49
40. "Seroconversion" is a term used to indicate the fact that an individual has converted from
seronegative (indicating no infection) to seropositive (indicating infection). See Lo, supra note 7,
at 267 n.1.
41. Gramelspacher & Siegler, supra note 38, at 389.
42. "Nonintact skin" refers to skin whose integrity is broken or impaired. "Mucous mem-
branes" line the cavities or canals of the body that open to the outside, such as the linings of the
mouth, the nose, the eyelids, and the genitourinary tract. Viruses may enter the body through a
break in the skin or through the mucous membranes. MosBY'S MEDICAL & NURSING DICTION-
ARY, supra note 3, at 702, 1138.
43. Gramelspacher & Siegler, supra note 38, at 389.
44. Lo, supra note 7, at 368.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 369. Although in the early stages of the disease, symptoms may be nonexistent or not
life threatening, eventually the disease weakens the immune system to the point that death results
from opportunistic infections. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
48. Lo, supra note 7, at 369.
49. Id. at 368. The CDC guidelines suggest that health care workers protect themselves with
gloves, masks, goggles, or gowns whenever they risk exposure to blood or body fluids. Id.
A topic closely related to the transmission of the HIV virus from an infected patient to a physi-
cian, is that of the transmission of the virus from a health care worker to a patient. The CDC
adopted guidelines in July, 1991 that deal with this issue. Bruce L. Ottley & Marguerite Nye
Conboy, A Reasonable Probability of Substantial Harm? Health Care Workers, AIDS, and the
Duty to Disclose, 25 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 65, 67 (1992). See Centers for Disease Control,
Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis
[Vol. 42:505
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There are additional reasons for the reluctance or unwillingness of
some health care workers to treat patients with HIV infection and
AIDS. Besides fear and the perception of risk, prejudice and reluc-
tance to care for certain types of patients (including homosexual pa-
tients and intravenous drug users) are two reasons for such re-
fusal. 50 Traditionally, the medical profession has emphasized the
principle of benefitting the patient rather than focusing on the medi-
cal practitioners' interests.51 In this sense, altruism rather than self-
interest should be the controlling motivation of those practicing
medicine. 52 However, this ideal of altruism may be viewed by some
as controversial when applied to epidemics.
In response to this issue, most major medical organizations have
issued policy statements addressing the AIDS epidemic. 54 In No-
B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, reprinted in, 266 JAMA 771
(1991). The guidelines do not advocate mandatory HIV testing of health care workers because of
low risk that a health care worker will transmit HIV to a patient. Ottley & Conboy, supra at 67.
The guidelines strongly encourage all health care workers to follow "universal precautions" when
handling blood and body fluids. Id. The guidelines also urge that health care workers who perform
invasive procedures which are "exposure-prone procedures" should be aware of their HIV status.
Id. HIV-positive health care workers should not perform exposure-prone procedures "unless they
have sought counsel from an expert review panel and been advised under what circumstances, if
any, they may continue to perform these procedures." Id. (quoting the Centers for Disease Con-
trol). Those circumstances include "notifying prospective patients of the [health care worker's]
seropositivity before they undergo exposure-prone invasive procedures." Id. (quoting the Centers
For Disease Control). The guidelines do not, however, place restrictions on HIV-positive health
care workers who perform invasive procedures which are not exposure prone, except for the ordi-
nary precautions of sterilization and disinfection. Id.
The United States Congress has even mandated that the states adopt the CDC guidelines to
obtain federal funding. Id. See H.R. 2622, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1991). If a state does not adopt
them, it loses federal health care funds. Ottley & Conboy, supra, at 67.
50. Gramelspacher & Siegler, supra note 38, at 385.
51. Lo, supra note 7, at 369.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Gramelspacher & Siegler, supra note 38, at 387. The American College of Physicians and
the Infectious Diseases Society of America issued this position statement:
The American College of Physicians and the Infectious Diseases Society of America
believe that physicians, other health care professionals, and hospitals are obligated to
provide competent and humane care to all patients, including patients with AIDS and
AIDS-related conditions as well as HIV-infected patients with unrelated medical
problems. The denial of appropriate care to patients for any reason is unethical.
Health & Pub. Pol'y Comm. et al., The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and Infec-
tion with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), 108 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 460, 462
(1988).
The American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) has issued this position statement:
ACEP firmly believes that appropriate emergency care should be provided to all
patients who seek emergency care, regardless of HIV status or risk factor.
ACEP believes that optimal care of HIV-infected individuals will be promoted by
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 42:505
vember of 1987, the American Medical Association (AMA) stated,
"A physician may not ethically refuse to treat a patient whose con-
dition is within the physician's current realm of competence solely
because the patient is seropositive [for the AIDS virus]." 55 The
Texas Medical Association and the Arizona State Board of Medical
Examiners took a different stance.56 They adopted policies which al-
lowed a physician to refuse to treat persons infected with the AIDS'
virus only if they referred the patient to another physician. 7
In January of 1988, the AMA conducted a national survey on
physicians' attitudes about AIDS and HIV-infected individuals, as
well as related practice issues.58 The survey was intended to gather
information for future educational programs about the disease and
coordinating health services and providers so that an integrated system of health care
delivery is created wherein emergency departments play a vital and targeted role.
American College of Emergency Physicians, AIDS - Statement of Principles and Interim Rec-
ommendations for Emergency Department Personnel and Prehospital Care Providers, 17 ANNALS
EMERGENCY MED. 1249 (1988).
The American College of Surgeons has issued this statement:
1. Surgeons have the same ethical obligations to render care to HIV-infected patients
as they have to care for other patients.
2. Surgeons should utilize the highest standards of infection control, involving the
most effective known sterile barriers, universal precautions, and scientifically accepted
infection control practices. This practice should extend to all sites where surgical care
is rendered.
American College of Surgeons, Statement on the Surgeon and HIV Infections, AMERICAN C.
SURGEONS BULL., Dec. 1991, at 4.
The American Dental Association has issued this advisory opinion:
A dentist has the general obligation to provide care to those in need. A decision not to
provide treatment to an individual because the individual has AIDS or is HIV sero-
positive, based solely on that fact, is unethical. Decisions with regard to the type of
dental treatment provided or referrals made or suggested, in such instances, should be
made on the same basis as they are made with other patients, that is, whether the
individual dentist believes he or she has need of another's skills, knowledge, equip-
ment or experience and whether the dentist believes, after consultation with the pa-
tient's physician if appropriate, the patient's health status would be significantly com-
promised by the provision of dental treatment.
ADA PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS AND CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 2 (American Dental Ass'n
Council on Ethics, Bylaws & Jud. Aff., 1991).
55. Council on Ethical & Jud. Aff., Ethical Issues Involved in the Growing AIDS Crisis, 259
JAMA 1360, 1361 (1988).
56. Taunya L. Banks, AIDS and the Right to Health Care, 4 ISSUES L. & MED. 151, 152
(1988). The Chairman of the Texas Association's Board of Counselors said, "We didn't agree that
a physician who diagnoses AIDS is mandated to treat the patient. I don't think it can be called
discrimination when it's a matter of a guy laying his health and career on the line." Lo, supra
note 7, at 369-70.
57. Banks, supra note 56, at 152.
58. L.B. Bresolin et al., Attitudes of U.S. Primary Care Physicians About HIV Disease and
AIDS, 2 AIDS CARE 117 (1990).
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to assist the Association in formulating appropriate policies. 9 The
AMA conducted telephone interviews with five hundred randomly
selected primary care physicians.6 0 One set of questions inquired
into the depth of the physicians' concerns about the personal risk of
contracting AIDS." The survey discovered that physicians are quite
concerned about contracting the HIV virus, and that their personal
anxiety levels are significant.6 Fifty-six percent of responding physi-
cians feared that they could become HIV-infected in the course of
their medical practices.6  Approximately 66% reported that their
families would worry if they treated more patients with the HIV
virus, and 76% stated that their staffs would worry."' Eighty-three
percent stated that they observed fear among their professional col-
leagues. 5 However, despite this fear, 70% concluded that they had
an ethical duty to treat HIV-infected patients. 6
It is important to recognize that some contemporary physicians
have flatly rejected professional codes or pronouncements that re-
quire them to care for patients infected with HIV.6 7 This kind of
rejection may be more prevalent among those who perceive them-
selves to be at the highest risk of occupational HIV infection, such
as vascular surgeons. 8 Some health care workers in the high risk
category complain that those espousing a duty to treat are not them-
selves at personal risk.6 9
C. The Doctor-Patient Relationship
In addressing the issue of whether a physician has an obligation
to treat a patient, it is important to understand how a physician-
patient relationship is created. The doctor-patient relationship is
based on the mutual consent of each party and may arise from an
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 121.
62. Id. at 124.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Lo, supra note 7, at 374.
68. Id. "Vasculature" refers to the disposition of arrangement of blood vessels in an organ or
body part. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2535 (1986). Vascular surgeons
are at risk of coming into contact with the patients blood through cuts, needlesticks, and splashes.
69. Lo, supra note 7, at 374.
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express or implied contract.7" Because of the consensual nature of
the relationship, a physician has no legal obligation 71 to accept any
patient for treatment.72 However, once a physician-patient relation-
ship is established, it continues until: "(1) it is terminated by mu-
tual consent; (2) it is terminated by the patient; (3) the physician's
services are no longer needed; or (4) the physician withdraws after
reasonable notice to the patient. 73 Once the physician has begun
treating the patient, he may not simply abandon the patient without
first ensuring that alternative medical care is available.74
In this context, a problematic situation may arise. A physician
may begin to treat a patient without being aware of the patient's
HIV status. In the course of treatment, the physician may then dis-
cover that the patient is HIV positive. The necessary treatment may
include procedures (i.e., surgery) that the physician perceives as
putting him at risk of becoming infected. If there is not adequate
time to give reasonable notice of withdrawing, or if the physician is
not able to ensure alternative medical care, the issue arises whether
the physician must continue to treat the patient. Most medical asso-
ciation position statements indicate there is an ethical obligation to
continue treatment. Furthermore, antidiscrimination statutes, such
as section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 75 may impose a
legal duty to care for seropositive persons.
D. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities in federally assisted pro-
grams or activities.76 Congress patterned the language of section
504 after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.77 Indeed, nega-
tive attitudes toward the disabled have been compared to attitudes
70. Id. at 376.
71. However, an ethical obligation to accept a patient may still exist. See supra notes 54-57
and accompanying text (discussing the stance taken by various associations regarding the ethical
duty of health care workers to care for HIV-infected patients).
72. Lo, supra note 7, at 376.
73. Id. (quoting George J. Annas, Legal Risks and Responsibilities of Physicians in the AIDS
Epidemic, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Apr.-May 1988, at 26, 30).
74. Id.
75. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
76. Id.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). See also School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 278 n.2 (1987)
(stating that § 504 is modeled after Title VI).
[Vol. 42:505
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toward underprivileged minority groups. 8 The language and history
of section 504 show Congress's desire to provide the disabled, like
underprivileged minorities, with the guarantee of equal
opportunity. 9
Section 504 provides in pertinent part: "no otherwise qualified in-
dividual with handicaps . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his
handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance. ' 80 The Act defines "program
or activity" as "all of the operations of . . . an entire corporation,
partnership, or other private organization or an entire sole proprie-
torship . . . which is principally engaged in the business of provid-
ing education, health care, housing, social services, or parks and rec-
reation; . . . any part of which is extended federal financial
assistance."'" Thus, the Act includes federally financed health care
facilities within its definition of "program or activity. 8 2
The Act defines "individual with handicaps" as "any person who
(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of
such impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an
impairment." 8
78. Jacobus ten Broek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL. L.
REV. 809, 814-15 (1966).
79. James F. Baxley, Rehabilitating Aids-Based Employment Discrimination: HIV Infection
as a Handicap Under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 23, 34
(1989). See 118 Cong. Rec. 3320 (1972). Senator Humphrey stated that: "The handicapped live
among us. They have the same hopes, the same fears, and the same ambitions as the rest of us
. . . . In their quest to achieve the benefits of our society, they ask no more than equality of
opportunity." Id. See also Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabili-
ties Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 122(a)(1), 92 Stat. 2955, 2984 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 701 (1988)) (stating that the purpose of the 1978 Amendments was "to develop and
implement, through research, training, services, and the guarantee of equal opportunity, compre-
hensive and coordinated programs of vocational rehabilitation and independent living").
80. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1985 and Supp. 1991). The regulations promulgated under the Act
define "federal financial assistance" as "any grant, loan, contract (other than a procurement con-
tract or a contract of insurance or guaranty)" or any other assistance in the form of: 1) funds; 2)
federal personnel services; or 3) real and personal property at less than fair market value. 45
C.F.R. § 84.3(h) (1991).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(3)(A)(ii) (1985 and Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (Supp. 1991). The Act refers to the term "individual with handicaps
. . . as defined in section 706(8) of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). The regulations promul-
gated under the Act define "physical or mental impairment" as:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskele-
tal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; repro-
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 42:505
Since its enactment in 1973, Congress has expanded the protec-
tion of section 504 to maximize the number of disabled individuals
who fall within its coverage. As originally enacted, the definition of
"handicapped individual" 84 reflected the statute's focus on voca-
tional rehabilitation. a5 The original definition included only those
whose disability limited their employability, and those who could be
expected to benefit from vocational rehabilitation.8 6 After reviewing
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's attempts to de-
vise regulations to implement the Act, Congress concluded that the
original definition of "handicapped individual" was too narrow to
address the range of discriminatory practices in housing, education,
and health care programs. Such discrimination evolved out of stere-
otypical attitudes and ignorance about the disabled.8 7 In 1974, Con-
gress expanded the definition to its current form. 8 The Supreme
ductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or (B)
any mental or physiological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syn-
drome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
45 C.F.R. § 84.3()(2)(i)(A)&(B) (1991). "Major life activities" are defined in the regulations as
"functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speak-
ing, breathing, learning, and working." Id. § 84.3()(2)(ii).
84. Originally, the Act used the term "handicapped individual." See infra note 86 and accom-
panying text. Congress later amended the Act to read "individual with handicaps." Rehabilitation
Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 103(d)(2), 100 Stat. 1807, 1810. This change
was suggested by persons representing individuals with disabilities who testified before a Congres-
sional subcommittee that "by retaining the adjective 'handicapped' before the noun 'person' the
legislation might be inadvertently adding to the stereotype that persons with handicaps are less
worthy." H.R. REP. No. 571, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3471,
3487.
85. Baxley, supra note 79, at 34-35.
86. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 278 n.3 (1987). The original definition was much more
restrictive. It provided that "[tihe term 'handicapped individual' means any individual who (A)
has a physical or mental disability which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial
handicap to employment and (B) can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of employability
from vocational rehabilitation services." Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 7(6),
87 Stat. 355, 361 (1973).
87. Arline, 480 U.S. at 278 n.3; see S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38, reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6388-89.
88. Congress explained the amended definition:
Clause [i] in the new definition eliminates any reference to employment and makes
the definition applicable to the provision of Federally-assisted services and programs.
Clause [ii] is intended to make clearer that the coverage of sections 503 and 504
extends to persons who have recovered - in whole or in part - from a handicapping
condition, such as mental or neurological illness, a heart attack, or cancer and to
persons who were classified as handicapped (for example, as mentally ill or mentally
retarded) but who may be discriminated against or otherwise be in need of the protec-
tion of § 503 and 504 . . . .[Clause iii] includes within the protection of sections 503
and 504 those persons who do not in fact have the condition which they are perceived
as having, as well as those persons whose mental or physical condition does not sub-
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Court has described the amended definition as "reflect[ing] Con-
gress' concern with protecting the disabled against discrimination
stemming not only from simple prejudice, but also from 'archaic at-
titudes and laws' and from 'the fact that American people are sim-
ply unfamiliar with and insensitive to the difficulties confront[ing]
individuals with handicaps.'"89
It is noteworthy that the Rehabilitation Act's coverage extends
only to programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance.
Nevertheless, Congress also sought to protect the disabled in situa-
tions outside the reach of the Rehabilitation Act. To achieve this
goal, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 was passed.
1. The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act upon the
Rehabilitation Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)" was signed
into law on July 26, 1990. The effective dates of its sections and
subsections range from July, 1990 to July, 1992. 91
The ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with disa-
bilities.92 Like section 504's definition of an individual with a handi-
cap, the ADA defines a "disability" as: "A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of [an] individual; B) a record of such an impairment; or
C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 93 However, the
ADA explicitly excludes from the definition any individuals who
currently use illegal drugs. 94 In addition, it amends section 706, to
which the Rehabilitation Act refers for its definition of "individual
with handicaps," to reflect this exclusion of current illegal drug
users.95 However, section 706 explicitly states that for purposes of
stantially limit their life activities and who thus are not technically within clause [i]
in the new definition.
S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 87, at 38-39, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6389-90.
89. Arline, 480 U.S. at 279 (quoting S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 87, at 50, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6400).
90. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp.
1990)).
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1990).
92. Id. § 12101(b).
93. Id. § 12102(2).
94. Id. § 12210.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(c)(i) (Supp. 1990). The statute states: "For purposes of subchapter V
of this chapter, the term 'individual with handicaps' does not include an individual who is cur-
rently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when a covered entity acts on the basis of such use."
Id.
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programs and activities providing health services, an otherwise qual-
ified individual will not be excluded because of his current use of
illegal drugs.96
An important difference between the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA is the scope of the two statutes. The Rehabilitation Act ap-
plies to "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance."' 97 Enforcement of the Rehabilitation Act is premised upon
federal involvement in the programs and activities covered by the
statute.98 By contrast, Congress's power to enact the ADA comes
from its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and to regu-
late commerce. 99 Therefore, unlike the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA
may be enforced against entities that do not receive any type of fed-
eral financial assistance.
The ADA is composed of four titles (subchapters). Title I ad-
dresses employment, 100 Title II focuses on public services, 10 1 and Ti-
tle III covers public accommodations and services operated by pri-
vate entities.10 2 Title III lists twelve categories of establishments
that are considered public accommodations, including doctors' of-
fices and hospitals.10 3 Finally, Title IV covers miscellaneous
provisions."14
Under Title III, "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on
96. Id. § 706(8)(c)(iii). This subsection states:
Notwithstanding clause (i), for purposes of programs and activities providing health
services and services provided under subchapters I, II and III of this chapter, an indi-
vidual shall not be excluded from the benefits of such programs or activities on the
basis of his or her current illegal use of drugs if he or she is otherwise entitled to such
services.
Id.
97. Id. § 794(a).
98. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications
of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413, 428-29 (1991).
99. Id. at 438. Titles I and Ill of the ADA apply only to activities that affect commerce. Id. at
440. Title I, which covers employment, applies to employers who have fifteen or more employees
who each work at least twenty weeks in the year. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (Supp. 1991). An excep-
tion is made for the two years following the effective date of the statute: the employer must have
at least twenty-five employees working at least twenty weeks in the year. Id. For purposes of Title
111, which covers doctors' offices and hospitals, "commerce" is defined as "travel, trade, traffic,
commerce, transportation, or communication (A) among the several states; (B) between any for-
eign country or any territory or possession and any State; or (C) between points in the same State
but through another State or foreign country." Id. § 12181(1),
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (Supp. 1991).
101. Id. §§ 12131-12165.
102. Id. §§ 12181-12189.
103. Id. § 12181(7)(F).
104. Id. §§ 12201-12213.
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the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." ' 10 5 There-
fore, in the context of the provision of health care, any person who
owns a doctor's office or hospital, leases (or leases to) a doctor's
office or hospital, or operates a doctor's office or hospital, is subject
to the statute's prohibitions. 106
The ADA provides a new approach for eliminating discrimination
against individuals with disabilities and may be applied in situations
where the discriminating entity does not receive any type of federal
funding. It will take time, however, to determine the manner in
which the courts will interpret the statute and its provisions. Mean-
while, the Rehabilitation Act remains a viable and tested means of
providing a cause of action to individuals who have been discrimi-
nated against on the basis of their disability.1'0 Together these two
statutes should provide a comprehensive approach toward achieving
the national goal of equality of opportunity and participation for
disabled individuals.'0 8
2. A Cause of Action under the Rehabilitation Act
A violation of the Act gives rise to two important rights that a
plaintiff may exercise in seeking complete vindication: (1) he may
bring a private cause of action, and (2) he may seek damages as a
remedy.
a. Existence of a private cause of action
A private right of action allows an individual to bring suit for
violation of a government statute. One benefit of this approach is
that the individual does not have to wait for the government to initi-
ate prosecution of the suit. In Pushkin v. Regents of the University
105. Id. § 12182(a).
106. Id. §§ 12181(7)(F), 12182(a).
107. Since the passage of the Rehabilitation Act in 1973, numerous cases have been brought by
plaintiffs charging discrimination on the basis of handicap. In the course of the nearly twenty
years it has existed, Congress has amended both the Act and the regulations enforcing it in order
to offer the Act's protection to the greatest number of individuals. See supra notes 84-89 and
accompanying text (discussing amendments to the Act and its regulations).
108. The ADA specifically provides that it shall not invalidate or limit the rights and remedies
available under any other federal or state law that provides greater or equal protection for individ-
uals with handicaps. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (1990).
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of Colorado,0 9 the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of whether a
private right of action exists under the provisions of the Rehabilita-
tion Act and held that such a right does exist."' In this case, Dr.
Pushkin was a medical doctor who alleged that he was denied ad-
mittance to the University of Colorado Psychiatric Residency Pro-
gram because he suffered from multiple sclerosis."' Dr. Pushkin
could not walk or write, and was confined to his wheelchair. " 2 The
district court ruled in favor of Pushkin, granting him an injunction
and directing that he be admitted to the program."' The University
appealed, arguing that no private cause of action existed under sec-
tion 504." 4
Initially, the Tenth Circuit noted that every federal appellate and
district court that had dealt with the issue held that a private right
of action existed under the statute." 5 It then looked to the United
109. 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
110. Id. at 1380.
111. Id. at 1376.
112. Id.
113. Id. Pushkin also sought money damages, but this request was denied. Id. No appeal was
taken from the denial.
114. Id. at 1376-80.
115. Id. The Pushkin court cited appellate court cases from seven circuits in support of the
proposition that a private cause of action exists under § 504: Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633
F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980); Camenisch v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980); Rogers
v. Frito Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980); NAACP v. Medi-
cal Ctr., Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979); Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d
1158 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 422 U.S. 397 (1979); Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d
863 (2d Cir. 1977); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977);
Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d
1277 (7th Cir. 1977). In another case, Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1230 n.7
(7th Cir. 1980), the 7th Circuit left open the question of whether a private right of action should,
after promulgation of regulations enacted pursuant § 504, be limited to judicial review of adminis-
trative proceedings. Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1377. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit decided in
Pushkin that a private right of action exists. Id. at 1380.
In cases subsequent to Pushkin, the remaining circuits have also recognized that a private cause
of action exists under § 504: Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495 (11 th Cir. 1991) (involving HIV-
positive inmates who were handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act and who
brought an action challenging policies and procedures of the Alabama Department of Correc-
tions); Cousins v. Secretary of the United States Dept. of Transp., 857 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1988)
(holding that the Rehabilitation Act provision carried with it a private right of action against the
federal government acting in its regulatory capacity); Hall v. United States Postal Serv., 857 F.2d
1073 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that federal employees alleging handicap discrimination in employ-
ment may maintain private actions against employers under the Rehabilitation Act, §§ 501 and
504); Andrews v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that a
private cause of action exists under § 504, in holding that a state statute of limitations applied to
the private action); Milbert v. Koop, 830 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that a military
exception to Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act did not apply to a commissioned officer of the
United States Public Health Service and did not bar the officer from bringing suit under the
520
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States Supreme Court for direction regarding the issue. In Cort v.
Ash," 6 the Supreme Court established a test for determining
whether a private right of action may be inferred from a statute
which does not expressly provide for such a right. 117 The Cort test
involved the following inquiry:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted" . . - that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor
of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it con-
sistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such
a remedy for the plaintiff? [Fourth], is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that
it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law? 118
The Pushkin court determined that the requirements of the Cort
test were fully satisfied when applied to section 504.119 Therefore, a
private right of action existed.
In further support of the determination that a private right of
action existed, the Pushkin court examined the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Cannon v. University of Chicago.2 ' There, the Supreme
Court stated that Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of
197211 was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.122 Since Title VI creates an implied right of action for dis-
crimination, the Court reasoned that Title IX should also be read to
imply a private right of action. 23 The Pushkin court decided that
since section 504 was also patterned after Title VI, the same reason-
ing applied. 2 " In Cannon, the Supreme Court recognized that Title
VI and Title IX sought to accomplish two purposes: "to avoid the
use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices," and
"to provide individual citizens effective protection against those
practices.' 25 The Court held that a private right of action was nec-
Rehabilitation Act).
116. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
117. Id. at 78.
118. Id. (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) (emphasis supplied and
citations omitted)).
119. Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1378.
120. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1988).
122. 441 U.S. at 694.
123. Id.
124. Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981).
125. Cannon. 441 U.S. at 704.
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essary to promote the latter purpose.'26 For these same reasons, the
Pushkin court held that section 504 must be read to imply a private
right of action in order for disabled individuals to have effective pro-
tection against discriminatory practices. 12 7
b. Standards regarding the burden of proof in a section 504 cause
of action
To prevail in a section 504 cause of action, a plaintiff must suc-
cessfully carry the applicable burden of proof. The Pushkin court
identified the appropriate burden of proof in a section 504 claim, as
set out by the Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College
v. Davis:2
1) The plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing that he was an
otherwise qualified disabled person apart from his handicap, and was re-
jected under circumstances which gave rise to the inference that his rejec-
tion was based solely on his handicap;
2) Once [the] plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, defendants have the
burden of going forward and proving that [the] plaintiff was not an other-
wise qualified disabled person, that is one who is able to meet all of the
program's requirements in spite of his handicap, or that his rejection from
the program was for reasons other than his handicap;
3) The plaintiff then has the burden of going forward with rebuttal evidence
showing that the defendants' reasons for rejecting the plaintiff are based on
misconceptions or unfounded factual conclusions, and that reasons articu-
lated for the rejection other than handicap encompass unjustified considera-
tion of the handicap itself. 129
c. The availability of damages as a remedy in a section 504 cause
of action
When a plaintiff brings a private cause of action for violation of a
federal statute, the availability of remedies becomes an important
issue. The Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of whether damages
were available for a violation of section 504 in Miener v. Mis-
126. Id.
127. Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1380.
128. 442 U.S. 397 (1979). In this case, the Supreme Court declined to decide whether a private
cause of action could be implied under § 504. The Court found that the handicapped person
bringing suit did not meet the "otherwise qualified" requirement of the statute. Id. at 405-14.
Therefore, it was unnecessary to address the issue of whether a private cause of action existed
because of the disposition of the case on its merits. Id. at 405 n.5.
129. Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1387; see also Davis, 442 U.S. at 397.
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souri.130 Terri Ann Miener had a history of medical problems that
resulted in serious learning disabilities.'I' She brought suit, alleging
that she was denied equal access to educational facilities in violation
of section 504.132
The Miener court identified the principle enunciated by the Su-
preme Court in Bell v. Hood'3 3 - that where legal rights are in-
vaded and a federal statute provides a right to sue for such invasion,
federal courts may use any available remedy to correct the wrong.'3 4
The court noted that administrative enforcement remedies provided
under the Act were inadequate to vindicate individual rights. 3 5
Support for a damage remedy could be found in the legislative his-
tory of the 1978 amendments to the Act.' 36 Additionally, the court
pointed to the right to seek money damages for civil rights violations
as an accepted feature of the American judicial system.3 Conse-
quently, it held that damages could be awarded under section
504.138
Numerous courts have held that a private right of action exists
under section 504,'13 and some federal courts have determined that
money damages are available for a violation of the statute. 40 How-
ever, the issue arises whether a person with a communicable disease
qualifies as an "otherwise qualified" handicapped individual, ena-
bling him to exercise that private right of action.
3. The Supreme Court's Application of the Rehabilitation Act to
Communicable Diseases
The words "handicapped" and "disabled" quickly engender a
number of commonly recognized conditions, such as blindness, deaf-
ness, and the inability to walk or speak. However, until recently, the
130. 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982).
131. Id. at 972.
132. Id.
133. 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
134. Miener, 673 F.2d at 977.
135. Id. at 978.
136. Id. The House-Senate Conference Committee eliminated a proposed prohibition against
money damages related to vocational rehabilitation programs under the Act. H.R. CoNF. REP. No.
1780, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7312, 7379.
137. Miener, 673 F.2d at 978.
138. Id. at 979.
139. See supra note 115 for a discussion of these cases.
140. See supra note 115. See also Patton v. Dumpson, 498 F. Supp. 933, 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(stating that absent an expression of congressional intent to the contrary, private actions under §
504 cannot be limited to suits for equitable relief).
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issue of whether a communicable disease could ever be considered a
disability under section 504 was unresolved. This issue was resolved
by the United States Supreme Court in School Board v. Arline,"'
where the Court extended the Rehabilitation Act's coverage to in-
clude tuberculosis, a contagious disease. 42 The Court addressed
whether the language and history of section 504 supported the in-
clusion of communicable diseases within the scope of the Act's pro-
tection." 3 In its analysis, the Court balanced two conflicting inter-
ests: the disabled individual's interest in being protected from
discrimination, and the general public's competing right to be pro-
tected from the spread of communicable diseases."
Gene Arline, the plaintiff in this case, began teaching elementary
school in Nassau County, Florida in 1966.1" She had been hospital-
ized for tuberculosis in 1957, but remained in remission until a re-
lapse occurred in 1977.146 After two additional relapses in 1978, she
was suspended and eventually dismissed because of the disease's
continued recurrence. 47
The Supreme Court first held that Arline was disabled within the
meaning of the Act because her previous hospitalization for tubercu-
losis meant that she had a record of impairment." 8 The school
board argued that the record of impairment was irrelevant and that
they had discharged Arline "because of the threat that her relapses
of tuberculosis posed to the health of others."' 9 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument, stating that such a result "would be incon-
sistent with the basic purpose of § 504, which is to insure that hand-
icapped individuals are not denied jobs or other benefits because of
the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others."' 150 The Court
then explained that although some persons with contagious diseases
may pose a health threat to others, that fact does not justify exclud-
141. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
142. Id. at 277-86.
143. Id. See Joseph E. Broadus, Arline: The Application of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to
Communicable Diseases, 39 LABOR L.J. 273 (1988) (discussing the Court's analysis of the lan-
guage and history of § 504).
144. Arline, 480 U.S. at 277-86.
145. Id. at 276.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 281. See supra note 84 and accompanying text for the definition of handicap.
149. Arline, 480 U.S. at 276.
150. Id. at 284.
[Vol. 42:505
AIDS DISCRIMINATION
ing all persons with contagious diseases from the Act's coverage. 151
The Court concluded that a person's contagious status does not nec-
essarily remove her from coverage under section 504.12
The Court then remanded the case to the lower court to deter-
mine whether Arline was "otherwise qualified" 15a as an elementary
teacher.' The Court identified an "otherwise qualified" person as
"one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of
his handicap."' 55 The Court delineated four factors that are essen-
tial to the "otherwise qualified" inquiry:
[Tihis inquiry should include "[findings of] facts, based on reasonable medi-
cal judgments given the state of medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of
the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how
long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the poten-
tial harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities the disease will be trans-
mitted and will cause varying degrees of harm."'
In making these findings, the Supreme Court noted that courts
should normally defer to the reasonable medical judgments of public
health officials. 57 Once a court evaluates the medical findings, it
must then evaluate if the "otherwise qualified" individual could be
"reasonably accommodated."' 58
The Supreme Court reached three conclusions in Arline. First,
after emphasizing the broad scope of the Act, it held that tuberculo-
sis, a contagious disease, constituted a disability, and that Arline
was a "handicapped individual" within the meaning of section
504.111 Second, the risk of contagion should be considered in deter-
mining whether a "handicapped individual" is "otherwise qualified,"
rather than viewed as an exception to the Act's coverage. 8 0 Third,
151. Id. at 285.
152. Id. at 285-86.
153. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988) (providing that no "otherwise qualified" individual with
handicaps shall be excluded from participation in a program receiving federal financial
assistance).
154. Arline, 480 U.S. at 289.
155. Id. at 287 n.17 (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406
(1979)).
156. Id. at 288 (quoting Brief for American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae at 19,
School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (No. 85-1277)).
157. Id.
158. Id. Accommodation is not reasonable if it imposes "undue financial and administrative
burdens," or requires "a fundamental alteration in the nature of a program." Southeastern Com-
munity College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410-12 (1979).
159. Arline, 480 U.S. at 289.
160. Id. at 285-86.
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in order to determine whether a person who is disabled by a conta-
gious disease is "otherwise qualified," the court must conduct an
individualized inquiry based on medical knowledge and scientific
fact. 1
The Arline Court expressly declined to rule on whether the HIV
infection might constitute a disability for purposes of section 504.162
However, because Arline held that at least one contagious disease
was protected by the Act, it opened the door to the possibility that
other contagious diseases, such as AIDS-related disorders, would be
similarly protected. 163
4. Application of the Rehabilitation Act to AIDS
The concepts developed in Arline were subsequently extended to
HIV-positive individuals in Chalk v. United States District Court
Central District of California,' where the Ninth Circuit recog-
nized AIDS as a communicable disease covered by the Act. 6 5 Vin-
cent Chalk was a teacher of hearing-impaired students.'66 He was
hospitalized with pneumocystis carnii pneumonia and was diagnosed
with AIDS.6 7 After he returned to work, the Orange County De-
partment of Education placed him on leave and eventually refused
to permit his return to normal classroom duties. 16 8 Instead, the de-
partment offered him an administrative position. 69 Chalk refused
the offer and brought suit, seeking a preliminary and permanent in-
junction to prevent, the department from excluding him from normal
classroom duties.17 0 The district court denied the injunction.' 7
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit applied the Supreme Court's four-
161. Id. at 287-88.
162. Id. at 282 n.7. The Arline Court stated:
This case does not present, and we therefore do not reach, the questions whether a
carrier of a contagious disease such as AIDS could be considered to have a physical
impairment, or whether such a person could be considered, solely on the basis of con-
tagiousness, a handicapped person as defined by the Act.
Id.
163. Wasson, supra note 9, at 253.
164. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
165. Id. at 704-05.
166. Id. at 703.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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part Arline test" 2 and found that there was a substantial probability
that Chalk would be found "otherwise qualified."' 78 It directed the
lower court to issue a preliminary injunction, which allowed Chalk
to return to the classroom.' 7  The Chalk decision is significant for
its recognition of AIDS as a disability under section 504 of the
Act. 175 It is also important for its judicial stance in applying the
reasoning of Arline to HIV carriers.7
Under section 504, courts have held that an HIV-positive person
qualifies as a disabled person. However, the Rehabilitation Act only
applies to programs and activities "receiving federal financial assis-
tance.' 77 Therefore, to bring a successful section 504 action, it is
important to establish that discrimination occurred within a feder-
ally funded program.
5. Receipt of Medicare or Medicaid Constitutes "Receiving Fed-
eral Financial Assistance"
When a plaintiff alleges a violation of section 504 in the health
172. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text (discussing Arline's "otherwise qualified"
inquiry).
173. Chalk. 840 F.2d at 708.
174. Id. at 712.
175. See id. at 704-05. In addition to the Ninth Circuit, several other circuit courts have held
that AIDS is a handicap as defined by the Act. See Severino v. North Fort Myers Fire Control
Dist., 935 F.2d 1179 (1lth Cir. 1991) (finding that an HIV-positive fire fighter was handicapped
within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act); Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. I,
909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990) (assuming for purposes of appeal that seropositivity to HIV antibo-
dies is an impairment protected under § 504).
176. Coreen K. Sweeney, Note, Aids in the Workplace: A Handicap Under the Law?, 39
DRAKE L. REV. 141, 149 (1989-1990). The "otherwise qualified" inquiry was applied in a case
involving a hospital's alleged discrimination against an HIV-positive health care worker, with the
result that the plaintiff was not "otherwise qualified" to perform his job. See Leckelt, 909 F.2d at
827.
Kevin Leckelt was employed at a hospital as a licensed practical nurse. Id. at 821. The hospital
became aware that Leckelt was the roommate of a current AIDS patient at the hospital. Id. at
822. After reviewing its infection control policies and investigating guidelines from the Centers for
Disease Control and the American Hospital Association, the hospital determined that it needed to
know whether the employee was seropositive for HIV antibodies. Id. When Leckelt failed to sub-
mit the results of a previously completed HIV test, he was terminated for failure to comply with
hospital policy. Id. at 824.
The court held that Leckelt was not discriminated against solely because of a perception that he
was infected with HIV. Id. at 825-26. Rather, he was terminated because he had violated the
hospital's infection control policies on reporting infectious or communicable diseases. Id. at 826.
Additionally, the court determined that Leckelt was not "otherwise qualified" to perform his job
as a licensed practical nurse because of his failure to comply with the hospital's infection control
policies. Id. at 830.
177. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (quoting the text
of § 504).
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care context, an important issue is whether a hospital's receipt of
Medicaid and Medicare triggers the coverage of section 504.. In
United States v. Baylor University Medical Center,1 8 the Fifth Cir-
cuit addressed this issue and determined that section 504 applied. 79
Approaching this as a question of first impression, the appellate
court held that receipt of Medicare and Medicaid constituted fed-
eral financial assistance.' 8
In this case, the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) received a complaint that Baylor University Medical Center
refused to permit a deaf patient to obtain an interpreter. Appar-
ently, the patient requested the interpreter so that she could under-
stand pre- and post-operative discussions with the staff.' 8 After
Baylor refused to allow HHS to investigate the complaint, the
United States filed suit alleging that Baylor's refusal violated sec-
tion 504 and the regulations implementing the statute. 82
The Baylor court grounded its determination that the receipt of
Medicare payments triggered section* 504 on three congruent
sources: the legislative history of the statutes prohibiting discrimina-
tion in federally funded programs; judicial interpretation of these
statutes; and regulations adopted pursuant to the statutes. 8 ' In ad-
dressing these sources, the court stated that section 504 was explic-
itly patterned after the discrimination prohibitions of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,184 which prohibit discrimination on the
basis of race or national origin in federally funded programs.' 85 Ad-
ditionally, the court noted that when Congress passed Medicare and
Medicaid legislation in 1965, several senators stated that the
prohibitions of Title VI would apply to recipients of Medicare and
Medicaid. 18 The Baylor court reasoned that the Rehabilitation
Act's language and legislative history indicate that its prohibition of
178. 736 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985).
179, Id. at 1042.
180. Id. at 1040. In addition, the Third Circuit affirmed a district court opinion that held in
part that Medicare and Medicaid triggered § 504. However, the court did so with no discussion of
the issue. Rather, the issue was affirmed in a footnote. NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 599 F.2d
1247, 1248 n.4 (3d Cir. 1979).
181. Baylor, 736 F.2d at 1041. The hospital would not have incurred any added expense by
allowing the patient to bring in the interpreter. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1042.
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
185. Baylor, 736 F.2d at 1042-43.
186. Id.
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discrimination on the basis of disability was equivalent to Title VI's
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race.187 Moreover, the
legislative history of the Medicare and Medicaid bill showed that
Congress intended these forms of federal assistance to trigger fed-
eral antidiscrimination protection. 188
The Baylor case makes it clear that the receipt of Medicare and
Medicaid payments constitutes federal financial assistance for pur-
poses of the Act. Accordingly, every health care facility or individ-
ual health care provider who receives Medicare and Medicaid pay-
ments qualifies as a program that is subject to the Act's coverage.
6. Determining the Scope of Section 504's Coverage When a Pro-
gram Receives Federal Funds
An institution may receive federal funding for one or more of its
activities or programs, and it may also conduct programs that do not
receive federal funding. Therefore, in order to determine who may
be subject to section 504's provisions, it is important to identify the
extent of the statute's coverage when a particular program within an
institution receives federal financial assistance.
The implementation of section 504 closely follows the antidis-
crimination provisions of Title VI and Title IX. 89 Since Congress
patterned both section 504 and Title IX after Title VI,' 90 judicial
interpretation of one of these statutes also has ramifications for the
others.
187. Id. at 1045.
188. Id. According to the court, the issue of whether Medicare and Medicaid constituted fed-
eral financial assistance to a program or activity was not extensively debated when the legislation
was passed in 1965. Id. at 1044. However, as the court noted, several senators stated that the
prohibitions of Title VI would apply to recipients of Medicare and Medicaid. Id. Senator Ribicoff
stated that in order to receive federal financial payments, hospitals would have "to abide by Title
VI." Id. (citing Ill CONG. REC. 15,813). Additionally, Senator Hart commented:
Federal tax funds collected from all the people may not be used to provide benefits to
institutions or agencies which discriminate on the grounds of race, color, or national
origin. This principle will . . . apply to hospital[s] and extended care and home
health services provided under the social security system, and will require institutions
and agencies furnishing these services to abide by title [VI] of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.
111 CONG. REC. 15,813 (1965), quoted in Baylor, 756 F.2d at 1044 n.13.
189. See Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981). Title
IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded programs. The "Assurance of
Compliance" is essentially a promise to comply with the statute.
190. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 278 n.2 (1987) (stating that Congress patterned §
504 after Title VI); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 684 (1979) (stating that Title
IX was patterned after Title VI).
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The Supreme Court was faced with determining the scope of Title
IX in Grove City College v. Bell.191 Grove City College was a pri-
vate coeducational college that refused state and federal financial
assistance' in order to retain its autonomy. 9 ' However, Grove City
enrolled a large number of students who received Basic Educational
Opportunity Grants (BEOGs) under the Department of Education's
Alternative Disbursement System.' 93 Under this system, students re-
ceived the assistance directly. 94 As a result, the Department deter-
mined that Grove City was a recipient of federal financial assis-
tance, as defined in Title IX's regulations, 95 and they requested
that the college execute the Assurance of Compliance required by
the statute.'96 When Grove City refused to comply, the Department
determined that the college and its students were no longer eligible
to receive BEOGs. 197 Grove City and four of its students filed suit to
prevent termination of the students' financial assistance.'9 8
The Supreme Court held that because some of its students re-
ceived BEOGs, Grove City was a recipient of federal financial assis-
tance.' 99 Grove City argued that because the students received the
assistance personally, the school was not a recipient of federal fund-
ing, and therefore was not subject to regulation.200 The Court re-
jected the argument. Looking at the language of the statute and its
legislative history, the Court determined that Congress did not "per-
ceive a substantive difference between direct institutional assistance
and aid received by a school through its students." 0' The Court
noted that quite often the economic effects of direct and indirect
assistance are indistinguishable.0 2
191. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
192. Id. at 559.
193. Id.
194. There are two procedures for computing and disbursing BEOGs. Under the Regular Dis-
bursement System, the Secretary of Education estimates the amount that an institution will need
for grants and advances that sum to the institution which itself selects eligible students, calculates
awards, and distributes the grants. The Alternative Disbursement System is a second option to
minimize government involvement in the administration of the BEOG program. Under this option,
institutions must make appropriate certifications to the Secretary, but the Secretary calculates the
awards and makes disbursements directly to eligible students. Id. at 559 n.5.
195. 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.2(g)(1), (h) (1991).
196, See Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 560. See also 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 (1991).
197. Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 561.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 563-64.
200. Id. at 564.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 565,
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However, the Court stated that the receipt of BEOGs by some of
Grove City's students did not subject the entire institution to cover-
age under Title IX.20 3 The BEOGs constituted financial assistance
to Grove City's financial aid program, and it was only that program
that could be regulated under the program-specific limitations of the
statute.2"4
Within a month and a half of this decision, bills to override Grove
City College were introduced.2"5 A Senate committee report stated
that the Grove City College ruling severely narrowed the coverage
of the four major civil rights statutes that prohibit discrimination in
federally assisted programs: Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Age Discrimination Act of
1975.206 Congress stated, "The purpose of the Civil Rights Restora-
tion Act of 1987 is to reaffirm pre-Grove City College judicial and
executive branch interpretations and enforcement practices which
provided for broad coverage of the antidiscrimination provisions of
these civil rights statutes. 20 7 Each of the affected statutes was
amended by adding a section defining "program" or "activity" to
make it clear that discrimination is prohibited throughout an entire
agency or institution if any part receives federal financial
assistance.208
The United States Supreme Court was presented with another op-
portunity to interpret the scope of section 504 in United States De-
partment of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America.20 9
The Court held that section 504's coverage is limited to those who
203. Id. at 573. The Court addressed an additional argument made by the college, that the
Department of Education could only regulate the administration of the program. The Court dis-
missed the assertion, saying that students who participated in the college's federally assisted finan-
cial aid program, but who did not themselves receive financial funds, were also protected against
discrimination. Id. at 571 n.21.
204. Id. at 573-74.
205. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President
Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 634 (1991).
206. S. REP. No. 64, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 4.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6. Section 504 was amended to read: "the term
program or activity' means all of the operations of . . .(3)(A) an entire corporation, partnership,
or other private organization, or an entire sole proprietorship . . . any part of which is extended
Federal financial assistance." Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259, § 4, 102
Stat. 28 (1988) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988)) (emphasis added).
209. 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
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actually "receive" federal financial assistance. 1 ' The Civil Aero-
nautics Board (CAB) argued that section 504 supported regulatory
jurisdiction over only those air carriers which received funds under
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.211 Certain organizations repre-
senting disabled individuals brought an action in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, challenging the
CAB's interpretation of its rulemaking authority under section
504.212 The Court of Appeals held that section 504 gave the CAB
jurisdiction over all air carriers by virtue of the federal financial
assistance provided to airports under the Airport and Airway Devel-
opment Act. 13
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded the case. It found that commercial airlines were not recipi-
ents of federal financial assistance and therefore section 504 was
inapplicable to commercial airlines.214
The Court looked at the language of section 504 and found that
by its terms, its coverage is limited to the "program or activity" that
"receiv[es] Federal financial assistance."'21 ' To identify the recipient
of the federal assistance, the Court looked at the underlying grant
statutes216 and found that Congress intended that the airport opera-
tors receive these funds. 217 According to the Court, Congress sought
to impose section 504 coverage as an obligation tied to the recipi-
ent's agreement to accept the federal funds.218 The Court stated,
"by limiting coverage to recipients, Congress imposes the obligations
of § 504 upon those who are in a position to accept or reject those
obligations as part of the decision whether or not to 'receive' federal
funds."218
210. Id. at 605.
211. Id. at 600. See 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1376(b), 1389 (1982) (authorizing the CAB to fix
reasonable rates of federal compensation for air carriers that transport mail, and to determine
whether federal compensation is necessary in order to ensure basic, essential air service to a given
area).
212. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. at 599.
213. Id. at 603. The United States provides financial assistance to airport operators through a
trust fund created by the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 and its successor statute,
the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982. 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2201-2227 (1982).
214. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. at 603-12.
215. Id. at 604.
216. See 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2201-2227 (1988) (stating the provisions of the Airport and Air-
way Improvement Act of 1982).
217. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. at 605.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 606.
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The Court rejected the argument that the airlines were "indirect
recipients" of the aid to airports.2 It distinguised intended benefi-
ciaries from intended recipients.221 Although it stated in Grove City
College that there was no distinction between direct and indirect
aid,2 2 the Court decided that these statements were made with re-
gard to Congress's intended recipient. 3 While Grove City College
stood for the proposition that Title IX coverage extends to Con-
gress's intended recipient, whether the aid was received directly or
indirectly, it did not mean that coverage attached to those who
merely benefitted from the aid.224 In this case, the airlines did not
receive the aid, but simply benefitted from the airports' use of the
aid.225 The Court noted that if section 504's scope was tied to eco-
nomic benefit, it would result in almost limitless coverage. 2
Justice Marshall dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and Black-
mun. He stated that the appropriate question was not whether com-
mercial airlines received federal financial assistance. 27 Rather, cit-
ing the language of section 504, he reasoned that the appropriate
question should be whether such airlines were in a position to ex-
clude handicapped persons from the participation in, to deny them
the benefit of, or to subject them to discrimination under a program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance. 228 The dissenters
believed that the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982
should be viewed as creating "programs" or "activities" related to
the construction and maintenance of safe and efficient airports and
airways. 29
Marshall then stated that the next question was whether the De-
partment of Transportation (DOT) had jurisdiction over commercial
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 564 (1984) (holding that only the specific
program receiving the federal assistance was subject to Title IX regulation).
223. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. at 606.
224. Id. at 607.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 608. The Court rejected the appellate court's reasoning that the airports and airlines
were "inextricably intertwined." Id. at 610. Under that reasoning, various industries and institu-
tions would become part of a federally assisted program or activity, not because they received
federal financial assistance, but because they were "inextricably intertwined" with an institution
that received assistance. This reasoning would extend § 504 beyond its bounds and give it a scope
broader than that intended by Congress. Id. at 611.
227. Id. at 614.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 615.
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airlines under section 504 for the purpose of ensuring that handi-
capped individuals were not "excluded from the participation in,
. . . denied the benefits of, or ... subjected to discrimination
under" those programs or activities.2"' In the dissent's view, the na-
ture of airline transportation made it essential that DOT have such
authority, since commercial airlines were "in a unique position to
deny public access to federally funded airport and airway
services." 231
Within a year after Paralyzed Veterans was decided, Congress
responded with the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986.232 This Act spe-
cifically prohibited air carriers from discriminating against "other-
wise qualified handicapped individual[s]" in the provision of air
transportation.23 s Although the Act did not affect section 504 di-
rectly, it reflected congressional disapproval of the Supreme Court's
interpretation of section 504 in Paralyzed Veterans. 3'
Grove City College, Paralyzed Veterans, and the legislation
passed as a result of these decisions highlight the difference between
the Supreme Court's and Congress's interpretations of the scope of
antidiscrimination statutes, including section 504. Each time the Su-
preme Court attempted to narrow the coverage of the provisions,
Congress responded with legislation broadening that coverage.
E. The Doctrine of Respondeat Superior
In the context of bringing a cause of action under section 504,
courts have considered the question of whether vicarious liability
can be applied under the doctrine of respondeat superior. In other
words, an issue may arise whether employers can be held liable for
the section 504 violations of their employees. Before applying vicari-
ous liability to section 504 actions, it is important to understand the
basic doctrine itself.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 615-16.
232. Pub. L. No. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080 (codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374 (1988)).
233. Id. A Senate report stated: "In recognition of the unique difficulties now faced by handi-
capped air travelers, [this bill] would mitigate the effect of DOT v. PVA by amending section 404
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to prohibit specifically discrimination against otherwise quali-
fied handicapped individuals." S. REP. No. 400, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2328, 2330.
234. Eskridge, supra note 205, at 631.
[Vol. 42:505
AIDS DISCRIMINATION
1. Respondeat Superior Generally
"Respondeat superior" is a Latin phrase meaning "let the master
answer."2 35 Under the common law principle of respondeat superior,
an employer is liable for the torts committed by his employee in the
furtherance of the employer's business, regardless of the employer's
fault . 36 The policy behind respondeat superior is to encourage em-
ployers and other principals to monitor their employees' conduct. 7
Behind this policy is the belief that employers and other principals
can often prevent their employees or agents from committing torts
in the furtherance of the employer's business. 38
There is an important distinction between employees or servants
on the one hand, and independent contractors on the other. The Re-
statement (Second) of Agency defines a "master" as a principal who
employs an agent, and who controls or has the right to control the
physical conduct of the agent in the performance of a service. 239 A
"servant" is an agent employed by a master, whose physical conduct
is controlled or subject to the control of the master.2 40 By contrast,
an independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to
do something for him, but who is not controlled by the other or
subject to the other's control with respect to his physical conduct.24 1
Generally, an employer is not liable for the torts of an independent
contractor.242 Therefore, in determining whether the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior applies, it is important to identify the actor either
235. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1311-12 (6th ed. 1990).
236. Rosenthal & Co. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n., 802 F.2d 963, 966 (7th Cir.
1986). The Restatement (Second) of Agency states that "[a] master is subject to liability for the
torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958). An employee's conduct is within the scope of employment if
it is of the kind he was employed to perform, it occurs substantially within authorized space and
time limits, and it is actuated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the master. Id. § 228.
Unauthorized acts may fall within the scope of employment. Id, § 230.
237. Rosenthal & Co., 802 F.2d at 968.
238. Id. at 969.
239. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 236, § 2.
240. Id.
241. Id. An independent contractor is one who, in the exercise of independent employment,
contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and is subject to his employer's
control only as to the end product or final result of his work. Hammes v. Suk, 190 N.W.2d 478,
480-81 (Minn. 1971).
242. Stone v. Pinkerton Farms, 741 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1984); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Town of
Cloverdale, 699 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983); Hyde v. Chevron U.S.A., 697 F.2d 614, 629-30
(5th Cir. 1983); Rooney v, United States, 634 F.2d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 1980); Vagle v. Pickands
Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1033 (1980).
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as a "servant" or an "independent contractor.12 4  Although no sin-
gle factor is determinative as to the existence of a master-servant or
employer-independent contractor relationship, the right of an em-
ployer to control the employee in his performance of assigned tasks
indicates a master-servant relationship. 4 The more extensive this
control, the more likely it is a court will hold that such a relation-
ship exists.24 5
2. The Effect of an Employee's Nonliability upon Vicarious Lia-
bility of an Employer
In a case where the employer's liability depends solely upon the
doctrine of respondeat superior, a plaintiff cannot recover against
the employer for damages resulting from the alleged wrongful or
negligent act of his employee after the employee has been dis-
243. In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor,
the Restatement (Second) of Agency lists factors which may be considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement the master may exercise over the
details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is
usually done under the direction of the employer, or by a specialist without
supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and
the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and
servant; and
() whether the principal is or is not in business.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 236, § 220.
244. Newcomb v. North East Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1983). See also In re Falkiner,
716 F. Supp. 895, 902 (E.D. Va. 1988) (delineating the elements considered in determining
whether an employment relationship exists as: the engagement of the employee, whether wages
are paid, the employer's power to dismiss and to control the alleged employee, and deeming the
power to control, including the manner in which work is done, the most important); Longo v.
Pennsylvania Elec., 618 F. Supp. 87, 90 (W.D. Pa. 1985) ("The hallmark of a master-servant
relationship is that the master not only controls the result of the work but has the right to direct
the manner in which the work shall be accomplished; the hallmark of an independent [contractor]
is that the person engaged in the work has exclusive control of the manner of performing it
.... "), afjd, 856 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1988); Afonso v. City of Boston, 587 F. Supp. 1342 (D.
Mass. 1984) (stating that the critical test of a master-servant relationship is the existence of the
master's right to control the servant's actions); Beach v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 542 F.
Supp. 1328 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (stating that the real and decisive test for the existence of a master-
servant relationship is the right to command the act and to direct and control the means, manner,
or method of performance), aff'd, 728 F.2d 407 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 825 (1984).
245. Newcomb, 721 F.2d at 1017.
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charged from personal liability. 46 When recovery is sought against
an employer and an employee on the basis of the employee's wrong-
ful act, a verdict exonerating the employee also exonerates the em-
ployer.2 47 Therefore, a verdict releasing the employee from liability,
while holding the employer liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, must be set aside.248
3. Vicarious Liability as Applied to Hospitals
There are many cases applying or recognizing the view that a hos-
pital, as an employer, master, or principal, may be held liable for
the negligence of a physician under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
246. 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master and Servant § 406 (1970). See also Smith v. Globe Ford, Inc.,
467 A.2d 1262, 1267 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1983); Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 513
N.E.2d 387 (IIl. 1987) (holding that when suit is brought against the master based solely on the
servant's negligent acts, if the servant is found not guilty, it necessarily follows that the master
cannot be guilty), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988); Moran v. North County Neurosurgery, 714
S.W.2d 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (establishing that where a plaintiff's right to recover against a
master is dependent entirely on respondeat superior and there is a finding of no negligence by the
servant, there should be no judgment against the master); Skalos v. Higgins, 449 A.2d 601 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1982) (stating that where master and servant are joined in an action wholly based on
the servant's negligence, the master cannot be held liable unless there is a cause of action against
the servant); Morton v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 399 S.E.2d 464 (W.Va. 1990) (concluding that
where master and servant are sued jointly in an action based solely on the tortious conduct of the
servant, if the servant is acquitted of guilt, there can be no recovery against the master).
247. Bausback v. K Mart Corp., 550 N.E.2d 1269 (111. App. Ct. 1990); Williams v. Venture
Stores, 673 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). See also Sanders v. Roberts, 563 So. 2d 1022, 1024
(Ala. 1990) (applying the rule that if the servant's conduct is the only basis of liability against the
master, then a verdict exonerating the servant normally relieves the master of liability); Louisville
& Nashville R.R. v. Garrett, 378 So. 2d 668, 676 (Ala. 1979) (delineating the general rule that a
verdict exonerating a servant generally relieves the master of liability when the servant's conduct
is the only basis of liability against the master); Roughton Pontiac Corp. v. Alston, 372 S.E.2d
147 (Va. 1988) (holding that the principle that a verdict for a servant necessarily exonerates the
master where the master's liability is solely dependent on the servant's conduct applies to inten-
tional tort cases as well as to negligence cases).
248. 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master and Servant § 406 (1970). See also Colonial Stores v. Fishel, 288
S.E.2d 21 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that when a lawsuit is brought against a servant and
master based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, the verdict against the master may be set
aside where the verdict releases the servant and where the pleadings and evidence fail to show any
independent tort of the master); Moran, 714 S.W.2d at 231 (explaining that when verdicts are
entered which inconsistently exonerate the servant of negligence yet hold the master liable, the
proper remedy is to grant the employer a judgment notwithstanding the verdict); Williams, 673
S.W.2d at 483 (finding that the verdict in favor of employees warranted the trial court's entry of
judgment for the employer notwithstanding the verdict, where employer's liability was predicated
solely on employees' wrongful act); White v. Lovgren, 387 N.W.2d 483 (Neb. 1986) (stating that
where there is no evidence that the master has been negligent other than through imputation of
the servant's negligent conduct under respondeat superior, judgment in favor of the servant on the
merits renders invalid any judgment against master).
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rior.249 In such a situation, a hospital's liability is limited to conduct
that is within the scope of the physician's employment or that is
performed at the direction of the hospital.250
As a general rule, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of a
physician functioning as an independent contractor.2 51 Therefore, a
recurring issue has been whether a particular physician, charged
with malpractice, is a servant/agent of a hospital or rather, is an
independent contractor.252  The courts have treated the, issue as a
factual matter to be determined by assessing all the factors in a
particular case.253 Several factors or relationships may reveal the
status of a physician. 25 For example, a resident physician is a ser-
vant of the hospital because of the nature of his duties and obliga-
tions to the hospital.2 55 Some factors which indicate a master-ser-
vant relationship include the hospital's payment of wages or fees, its
provision of equipment, supplies, support personnel, or office space,
249. In the following states, the courts have held or recognized that a hospital may be held
liable for the negligence of a physician who is the agent, servant, or employee of the hospital
under the general rule that an employer or principal may be held liable for the tortious conduct of
an agent, servant, or employee: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, District of Co-
lumbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. John D. Hodson, Annotation, Liability of Hospital or
Sanitarium for Negligence of Physician or Surgeon, 51 A.L.R. 4TH 235, 260 (1987 & Supp.
1991).
The general principles of respondeat superior were not always applied to hospitals. The first
case to change this was Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957), where the New York Court of
Appeals ruled that a hospital's liability for the negligence of its employees must be governed by
the same principles that apply to all other employers. Id. at 9. Historically, charitable hospitals
were not held responsible for the negligence of their physicians and nurses. Id. at 5-6. Over time, a
body of law developed making the liability of a hospital for the acts of its employees depend on
whether the injury-producing act was "administrative" or "medical." Id. at 3. However, no clear
distinction between the two terms existed, so courts were inconsistent in applying the terms. Id.
The court's decision in Bing changed the parameters of a hospital's liability for the acts of its
employees.
250. Reynolds v. Swigert, 697 P.2d 504, 508 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (explaining that if a physi-
cian is an employee of a hospital, the hospital may be held liable for tortious acts done by the
physician within the scope of his employment).
251. Elam v. College Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (citing prece-
dent that a hospital may not be liable for a doctor's malpractice absent a relationship where the
doctor is actually employed by the hospital or is ostensibly the agent of the hospital).
252. Hodson, supra note 249, at 245.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Kelley v. Rossi, 481 N.E.2d 1340, 1343 (Mass. 1985) (stating that in a medical malprac-
tice action brought against a resident physician and a hospital, a house officer, such as a resident,
has certain obligations that demonstrate he is a servant of the hospital).
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and its practice of billing patients for the services provided by the
physician.25 The courts generally view such support as evidence
that the physician is an employee of the hospital or that the hospital
has control over the physician.2 57 Additionally, where the hospital
sets the physician's schedule and establishes policies and procedures
to be followed by the physician, courts have considered this a regu-
lation of the physician's work.258 The hospital's control supports the
conclusion that it has made the physician its agent.259
The doctrine of apparent or ostensible agency provides an excep-
tion to the general rule that a hospital is not liable for the negli-
gence of a physician with independent contractor status.26 0 Courts
256. Hodson, supra note 249, at 247. See also Gregg v. National Medical Health Care Servs.,
699 P.2d 925, 929 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the fact that a physician was paid a weekly
sum to commute to the hospital to act as a consultant raised a question of fact whether the
physician was a part-time employee rather than an independent contractor); Hodges v. Doctors
Hosp., 234 S.E.2d 116, 118 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that where a hospital paid a doctor for
providing emergency room services, required him to provide those services to remain on staff, and
exercised control over him, such evidence raised a question whether the physician was an em-
ployee); Hill v. St. Clare's Hosp., 490 N.E.2d 823, 828-29 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that the owner of
a medical clinic could be vicariously liable for a physician's negligence where the bill for services
bore the name of the clinic and the owner, payment was made to the owner, and the owner wrote
weekly checks to physicians); Mertsaris v. 73rd Corp., 482 N.Y.S.2d 792, 801 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984) (asserting that because an anesthesiologist had an office and sleeping quarters at the hospi-
tal, and the hospital billed patients for his services, these facts supported the finding that the
hospital was vicariously liable); Thomas v. Raleigh Gen. Hosp., 358 S.E.2d 222, 225 (W. Va.
1987) (holding that a hospital could be vicariously liable for a physician's negligence where it
gave an anesthesiologist an office and stipend for his duties, and the patient had'no choice in
choosing an anesthesiologist).
257. Hodson, supra note 249, at 247.
258. Id. at 248. See also Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 500 P.2d 1153 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)
(pointing out that the fact that a hospital had the right to control performance standards of a
radiologist supported the hospital's liability); Suhor v. Medina, 421 So. 2d 271 (La. Ct. App.
1982) (indicating that two factors considered in determining the hospital's liability were that the
physician was required to be "on duty" to perform emergency services, and that the hospital had
control over working time and physical activities); Willoughby v. Wilkins, 310 S.E.2d 90 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1983) (finding that the employer-employee relationship was supported by evidence that
the employment contract specified the physician's leave and vacation time, the physician's work
schedule was subject to the hospital's approval, and the physician could not maintain a private
practice); Smith v. St. Francis Hosp., 676 P.2d 279, 281 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that an
emergency room physician, employed by a corporation which staffed the hospital's emergency
room, was an agent of the hospital where he was required to comply with hospital regulations, was
reviewed by the hospital, and was required to meet hospital quality of care standards).
259. Hodson, supra note 249, at 248. See also Newton County Hosp. v. Nickolson, 207 S.E.2d
659, 662 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (describing the true test of whether a person is employed as a
servant or independent contractor as whether the employer has the right to direct the time, man-
ner, methods, and means of execution of the work); Reynolds v. Swigert, 697 P.2d 504 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1984) (considering the fact that the hospital retained the right to exercise control over all
details of the physician's professional work through the physician's employment contract).
260. The labels "ostensible agency," "apparent authority," and "agency by estoppel" appear to
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have held that ostensible agency occurs where a hospital "holds out"
to its patients that it is a provider of medical services, the patient
goes to that hospital, and the patient relies on the hospital to deliver
those medical services.2"' Ostensible agency also applies where the
hospital "holds out" to patients that the physicians associated with
it are its employees.262 Some courts have concluded that ostensible
agency exists under either of the two "holding out" theories where
the physician was not independently selected by the injured patient,
but instead was selected by the hospital as the treating physician
upon which the patient relied for medical care. 63
be used interchangeably by the courts in reference to the theory of liability. Hodson, supra note
249, at 271 n.34.
261. Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358, 371 (Miss. 1985) (emphasizing that where a patient
engaged and relied on the services of a hospital, and where the hospital held itself out as providing
a specific medical service and entered into a contract with physicians to provide the service, the
hospital was subject to vicarious liability).
262. See Irving v. Doctors Hosp., 415 So. 2d 55, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (superseded by stat-
ute on other grounds as stated in Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989)) (outlining the
doctrines of apparent authority and estoppel; a hospital would be estopped to deny that the physi-
cian was its agent if it held itself out to the public as the employer of the physician and caused a
third person to rely upon the physician's care).
In the following states, the courts have recognized that a hospital may be liable for the negli-
gence of a physician with independent contractor status where the hospital "holds out" to its
patients or the public that it is a provider of medical services, or that the physicians associated
with it are its employees: Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. Hodson, supra note 249, at 271-73.
263. Hodson, supra note 249, at 247. See also Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 500 P.2d 1153,
1157-59 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that a hospital was vicariously liable for the malpractice
of a radiologist because the hospital chose the radiologist, and patients today expect to be cured
by hospitals); Irving, 415 So. 2d at 59 (holding a hospital liable for a doctor's negligence where
the jury found that the plaintiff took her daughter to the hospital for hospital treatment); Newton
County Hosp., 207 S.E.2d at 662 (stating that when a person is taken directly to a hospital and is
diagnosed or treated by a physician hired by the hospital, the doctor is the hospital's servant);
Paintsville Hosp. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Ky. 1985) (asserting that a crucial question was
whether the plaintiff, upon being admitted to the hospital, was looking to it for treatment, rather
than viewing the hospital as a situs where the patient's physician would treat him); Wells v.
Woman's Hosp. Found., 286 So. 2d 439, 444 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (concluding that respondeat
superior was applicable because the plaintiff did not consult a private physician, but instead was
treated by physicians who were "staff-employees" of the hospital); Grewe v. Mount Clemens Gen.
Hosp., 273 N.W.2d 429, 433 (Mich. 1978) (finding that a relevant factor in determining whether
the patient looked to the hospital for treatment was whether the physician was provided by the
hospital or whether the physician and patient had a relationship independent of the hospital set-
ting); Hardy, 471 So. 2d at 371 (concluding that respondeat superior applies where a patient
relies on a hospital to provide medical services without regard to the identity of a particular physi-
cian); Hill v. St. Clare's Hosp., 490 N.E.2d 823 (N.Y. 1986) (finding the owner of a medical
clinic vicariously liable where the patient's prior relationship was with the clinic, rather than with
any of the physicians and where the patient accepted physician's services based on the fact that
they were offered by the clinic); Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa.
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The doctrine of ostensible agency was examined and applied to an
independent contractor physician's negligent act in Grewe v. Mount
Clemens General Hospital.2"4 There, a patient suffering a dislocated
shoulder went to the hospital where several attempts were made to
reduce the dislocation.26 5 After the efforts proved unsuccessful, a
physician who was not an employee but who had staff privileges at-
tempted reduction by placing his foot on the patient's chest and
pulling the patient's arm.266 The patient later brought suit claiming
that these attempts at reduction resulted in nerve damage and a
fracture.267
The court acknowledged that, generally speaking, a hospital is not
vicariously liable for the negligence of a physician who is an inde-
pendent contractor and who merely used the hospital's facilities to
render treatment to his patients.26 ' However, if the individual looked
to the hospital to provide him with medical treatment, and there
had been a representation by the hospital that medical treatment
would be given by the physicians working there, then agency by es-
toppel could be found.2 69 The court stated that the critical question
was whether the plaintiff, at the time of his admission to the hospi-
tal, was looking to the hospital for treatment or whether he merely
viewed the hospital as the site where his physician would treat
him.270 A relevant factor in answering this cjuestion was whether the
hospital provided the plaintiff with the physician, or whether the
plaintiff and the physician had a relationship independent of the
hospital setting.271
The Grewe court stated that before there could be a recovery
against a principal for the alleged acts of an ostensible agent, three
things must be proved:
[FirstI [t]he person dealing with the agent must do so with belief in the
Super. Ct. 1980) (explaining that even a physician with independent contractor status may be an
ostensible agent of a hospital where patients look to the hospital rather than to the individual
physician for care); Edmonds v. Chamberlain Memorial Hosp., 629 S.W.2d 28, 31-32 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1981) (denying summary judgment in favor of the hospital, after considering the fact that
the patient relied on the hospital to select a physician).
264. 273 N.W.2d 429 (Mich. 1978).
265. Id. at 431.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 432-33.
269. Id. at 433.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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agent's authority and this belief must be a reasonable one; [second,] such
belief must be generated by some act or neglect of the principal sought to be
charged; [finally,] the third person relying on the agent's apparent authority
must not be guilty of negligence.""'
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the court found
that there was nothing that should have put the plaintiff on notice
that the physician in question was an independent contractor.273 Ad-
ditionally, the court was convinced that the plaintiff, when he en-
tered the hospital, was seeking treatment from the hospital itself.27'
Since the plaintiff looked to the hospital for his treatment, and was
treated by a physician who was an ostensible agent of the hospital,
the hospital could be vicariously liable.275
In summary, courts have dealt with the issue of whether a hospi-
tal may be held liable for the actions of a physician by assessing
various factors to determine whether a master-servant relationship
exists. Factors indicating that the hospital had control over the phy-
sician will support the application of the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior. However, even if the relationship indicates that the physician
had independent contractor status, vicarious liability may still be
imputed under the theory of ostensible agency. The issue thus be-
comes whether vicarious liability may appropriately be applied in a
section 504 suit, where a physician has discriminated against an
HIV-positive individual.
4. Respondeat Superior Applied to Actions Brought under
Section 504
In determining whether a hospital may be liable for the actions of
a physician who violates section 504, the first issue is whether the
doctrine of respondeat superior applies to actions brought under the
Act. In Patton v. Dumpson,2 76 a New York federal district court
considered whether vicarious liability was appropriate in an action
brought under section 504 and determined that it was. 77 There,
William Patton was a disabled child, abandoned by his mother, who
became the legal responsibility of certain public and private child
272. Id. at 434 (quoting Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic, 128 P.2d 705, 708
(Cal. Ct. App. 1942)).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 434-35.
275. Id. at 435.
276. 498 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
277. Id. at 942-44.
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278welfare agencies. 8 William sued the executive heads of the agen-
cies on several grounds, including a claim that they denied him an
education solely because he suffered from physical and mental disa-
bilities, in violation of section 504.27
The court reasoned that respondeat superior was applicable to
section 504 suits and was entirely consistent with the statute's policy
of eliminating discrimination against the disabled. 80 In support of
this, the court stated:
The justification for imposing vicarious liability on employers for the acts of
their employees is well-known. It creates an incentive for the employer to
exercise special care in the selection, instruction and supervision of his em-
ployees, . . . [i]n the absence of Congressional directive to the contrary, this
court can assume only that Congress intended the judiciary to use every
available tool to eliminate discrimination against the handicapped in feder-
ally funded programs281
The court noted that respondeat superior was also applicable in
private actions brought under various other civil rights statutes,
such as Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968282 and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.283 The court's analysis identified
strong legal precedents and compelling policy considerations that
supported the application of respondeat superior to section 504 ac-
tions. 84 Therefore, a section 504 plaintiff is not precluded from ap-
plying the doctrine in an appropriate situation. However, when such
278. Id. at 935.
279. Id. at 935-36.
280. Id. at 943.
281. Id. In Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit addressed an
action brought by a deaf inmate against a state correctional facility, alleging deprivation of his
rights under § 504. Id. at 561. He also brought a claim against the Director of the Arizona
Department of Corrections, based on vicarious liability. Id. at 567.
Bonner was deaf, mute, and suffering from vision loss. Id. at 560. None of the personnel at the
state prison where he was an inmate knew sign language. Id. Bonner claimed that his inability to
effectively communicate without a qualified interpreter severely inhibited his ability to participate
or benefit from various prison programs, hearings, and activities. Id. He alleged that his repeated
requests for a qualified interpreter were ignored by prison officials. Id. at 560-61.
Although existing genuine issues of fact precluded summary judgment, the court held that the
pl~intitms claim, based'on respondeat superior, was appropriate and should not be dismissed. Id. at
563-67. It cited Patton's policy argument as support for the application of vicarious liability to §
504 claims. Id. at 566-67.
282. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (1988) (prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing).
283. Patton, 498 F. Supp. at 942 (analogizing the application of respondeat superior in a § 504
cause of action to the doctrine's application in other civil rights statutes). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2, 3 (1977).
284. Patton, 498 F. Supp. at 943.
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a plaintiff brings suit against a physician alleging a violation of sec-
tion 504 and against a hospital alleging vicarious liability for the
acts of the physician, the fact finder must examine the relationship
between the physician and the hospital. Furthermore, while vicari-
ous liability may be based on respondeat superior or ostensible
agency, Patton did not expressly decide the applicability of ostensi-
ble agency to a section 504 suit. Therefore, it is uncertain whether
courts would find ostensible agency applicable by analogy to respon-
deat superior. Agency principals are especially important within the
context of a hospital's liability for its physicians' refusal to treat
HIV-infected patients.
5. Determining Liability When a Physician Discriminates on the
Basis of HIV-Positive Status
In response to the AIDS epidemic, some health care workers have
refused to care for HIV-positive individuals out of fear that they
will contract the disease. This creates the potential for a situation in
which an HIV-positive individual alleges that a physician's refusal
to continue treatment was a violation of section 504. In this context,
the issue arises whether the physician's hospital could be held vicari-
ously liable. A Massachusetts federal court addressed this exact is-
sue in Glanz v. Vernick.8 5 There the court held that a hospital
could be held vicariously liable for an employee physician's alleged
section 504 violation against an HIV-positive individual.286 The
plaintiff, Vadnais, went to the Ear, Nose and Throat Clinic at Beth
Israel Hospital and was referred to Dr. Vernick, a staff physician. 8 7
Dr. Vernick treated Vadnais for severe ear pain by prescribing an-
tibiotics; one month later he diagnosed a perforation in Vadnais's
right ear. 28 After several visits, Dr. Vernick recommended that sur-
gery be performed to repair the perforation.289 After Vadnais agreed
to the surgery, Vernick learned that Vadnais was infected with
HIV.290 In March of 1987, he informed Vadnais that he would not
perform the operation.291 Vadnais continued to use ear drops and
antibiotics, but the painful condition persisted. Nearly one and a
285. 756 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass. 1991).
286. Id. at 637.
287. Id. at 634.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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half years later, another physician, who was unaware of Vadnais's
HIV status, performed the surgery and cured the problem. 92
Vadnais sued Dr. Vernick and Beth Israel Hospital under section
504. He sought to enjoin the defendants from denying him any fur-
ther surgical procedures and to recover monetary damages. 93
The first issue that the court addressed was whether Beth Israel
qualified as a federally funded program for purposes of the Rehabil-
itation Act by virtue of its receipt of Medicare and Medicaid pay-
ments.2 94 The court cited United States v. Baylor University Medi-
cal Center295 for the proposition that the receipt of Medicare and
Medicaid payments by a hospital triggered the coverage of section
504.219 Following the decision in Baylor, the court in Grewe v.
Mount Clemens General Hospital held that a hospital's receipt of
Medicare and Medicaid payments constituted federal financial as-
sistance for purposes of section 504.297 Since Vadnais presented
himself to the clinic, which in turn referred him to Dr. Vernick, a
staff physician, the court refused to grant summary judgment to the
defendants on the ground that the alleged discrimination did not
occur in a federally funded program. 98 The defendants also asserted
that the discrimination did not occur in a federally funded program
because Vadnais's surgery was elective and not covered by Medi-
caid. 299 The court rejected this argument, citing Grove City College
for the proposition that if the clinic was "a program or activity for
the purposes of § 504, then it cannot discriminate against any hand-
icapped individuals, regardless of whether they receive Medicaid
benefits or not. 300
292. Id.
293. Id. Vadnais brought suit in April of 1989. Prior to Vadnais's death, the defendants filed
motions for summary judgment. After Vadnais's death, the executor of his estate was substituted
as plaintiff. The defendants' motion was stayed to allow them to file a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the federal cause of action abated with Vadnais's death. In November of 1990, the
district court addressed the issue. The court held that statutory construction of federal civil rights
statutes was governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 which, in turn, governed the choice of law on the
question of abatement. Section 1988 provides that when civil rights statutes are "deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies," the federal courts should consult the law of the
state. Under Massachusetts' survival statute, the plaintiff's action for compensatory damages sur-
vived, but the claim for punitive damages did not. Glanz, 756 F. Supp. at 639.
294. Glanz, 756 F. Supp. at 635.
295. 736 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 1189 (1985).
296. Glanz, 756 F. Supp. at 635-36.
297. Id. at 636.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
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Beth Israel then argued that under Massachusetts case law, a
hospital cannot be held liable for the actions of its physicians.30
The court rejected this proposition, saying that the question of lia-
bility was properly decided under the principles of agency law. 30 2
The test that the court used for vicarious liability was whether the
hospital exercised any power or control over the professional con-
duct of the physician. 303 Applying this test, the court found suffi-
cient evidence that the hospital did exert control over its physicians
regarding treatment of HIV-positive patients. 0 4 The hospital's
"AIDS coordinator" contacted Dr. Vernick to ascertain whether his
refusal to treat Vadnais was appropriate. 05 Other factors the court
looked to included the facts that Dr. Vernick received a salary for
resident teaching and that the hospital performed the billing for his
services.30 These factors supported a finding that Dr. Vernick was
the hospital's employee, rather than an independent contractor. 0 7
Consequently, the court determined that enough factual evidence
existed to preclude summary judgment on the ground that the hos-
pital was not liable for Dr. Vernick's actions.30 8
Beth Israel's potential liability depended largely upon the applica-
tion of vicarious liability to the section 504 cause of action. The
court addressed this issue and found the doctrine applicable.3 0 1 It
cited Bonner v. Lewis 310 and Patton v. Dumpson,31' quoting Pat-
ton's policy reasons for permitting vicarious liability in suits brought
under section 504.312 In view of these policy reasons, the Glanz
court stated, "[I]t is appropriate to hold Beth Israel responsible for
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. See also Kelley v. Rossi, 481 N.E.2d 1340 (Mass. 1985) (holding that in a medical
malpractice action brought against a resident physician and a hospital, the right to control an
agent's activities is the guiding principle in deciding vicarious liability); Kapp v. Ballantine, 402
N.E.2d 463 (Mass. 1980) (holding that in a medical malpractice action brought against physi-
cians and a hospital, the hospital was not vicariously liable because the plaintiff failed to show
power or control over the physician's professional conduct).
304. Glanz, 756 F. Supp. at 636.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. 857 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1988). See supra note 281 for a discussion of Bonner.
311. 498 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See supra notes 276-84 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Patton.
312. Glanz, 756 F. Supp. at 636-37. See supra note 281 and accompanying text (quoting Pat-
ton's policy reasons).
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the actions of its medical staff in complying with the Rehabilitation
Act, even without a finding of power or control. 3 13
The court then addressed whether Dr. Vernick could be held per-
sonally liable for discriminating against Vadnais. 13 Vadnais argued
that the doctor should be held liable because he treated Medicare
and Medicaid patients in the context of his personal medical prac-
tice, and occasionally treated them at the hospital. 15
The court began its analysis by citing Grove City College for the
proposition that, for programs receiving federal funding, application
of antidiscrimination provisions must be program specific a.3 1  There-
fore, it reasoned that application of section 504 in this case must be
"limited to the relevant program receiving federal funds.1 31 7 The
court then identified two distinct programs that Dr. Vernick partici-
pated in: 1) his private medical practice from which he personally
received Medicare or Medicaid payments, and 2) Beth Israel's clinic
at which he held a resident teaching position.3 18 The court identified
the second program, Beth Israel's clinic, as the relevant program in
this situation.3 19 Therefore, Dr. Vernick's personal liability de-
pended solely on his participation in Beth Israel's program. 320
In addressing this issue, the Glanz court cited United States De-
partment of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America,21
which held that section 504's prohibitions apply only to those who
actually receive federal funding, but not to those who are merely
beneficiaries of the assistance. 22 Citing the Supreme Court, the
court stated that "[b]y limiting coverage to recipients, Congress im-
313. Glanz, 756 F. Supp. at 637.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 570 (1984). However, Congress ex-
pressly rejected this narrow interpretation with the passage of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987, Pub. L. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). See S. REP. No. 64, supra note 206, at 1-4,
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3-6 (discussing the purpose of the Civil Rights Restoration
Act). The Glanz court did not explain its reason for applying the pre-amendment interpretation of
the scope of § 504. In this regard, it is important to note the time frame in which the events
occurred. The alleged discriminatory act occurred in March of 1987. Glanz, 756 F. Supp. at 639.
The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 was passed in March, 1988. S. REP. No. 64, supra note
206, at 1, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3. Therefore, the alleged act occurred before the
passage of the Civil Rights Restoration Act.
317. Glanz, 756 F. Supp. at 639.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
322. Id.
19921
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
poses the obligations of § 504 upon those who are in a position to
accept or reject those obligations as part of the decision whether or
not to 'receive' federal funds." '23 Applying this standard, the Glanz
court found that Dr. Vernick was not in a position to accept or re-
ject federal assistance in his resident teaching position at Beth
Israel. 24 Moreover, he was not bound by section 504's prohibitions
by simply choosing to work at a federally funded hospital.3 25 As a
result, the court held that Dr. Vernick could not be held personally
liable under the Act for participating in Beth Israel's federally
funded program.32
The court also addressed the defendants' argument that Vadnais
was not "otherwise qualified" for elective ear surgery.32 7 Initially,
the court noted that it was appropriate for the defendants to con-
sider Vadnais's disability in determining whether he was "otherwise
qualified" for surgery.3 28 Citing School Board v. Arline,n29 it stated
that the defendant hospital could take into account the risks im-
posed on both the patient 'and the hospital by the prospect of per-
forming surgery on an HIV-positive patient.33 If they concluded
that risks existed, they needed to consider whether it was possible to
make reasonable accommodations to enable the surgery to be per-
formed.3 31 Following Arline's mandate, the court needed to make
"an individualized inquiry and appropriate findings of fact" in mak-
ing the "otherwise qualified" determination. 2 Here, the facts were
in dispute regarding the risks of surgery. 3 However, based on the
plaintiff's evidence, enough facts supported the conclusion that
Vadnais was "otherwise qualified" for surgery. 3 4 Additionally, the
defendants failed to produce any evidence that reasonable accom-
modations were impossible to make.3
The court acknowledged that there was merit in the defendants'
323, Glanz, 756 F. Supp. at 639.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 640.
328. Id. at 638.
329. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
330. Glanz, 756 F. Supp. at 638.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
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argument that a court should defer to a physician's medical judg-
ment, again relying on Arline.38 However, accepting this argument
at face value would render section 504 powerless to prevent discrim-
ination in the health care area. 3 7 The court concluded that the ap-
propriate approach was the one discussed in Pushkin v. Regents of
the University of Colorado,3-3 where deference to medical opinion
was balanced against the detection of discriminatory motives.3 39
The Glanz court -held that because the receipt of Medicare and
Medicaid payments brought Beth Israel within section 504 cover-
age, and because there were genuine issues of material fact regard-
ing the "otherwise qualified" inquiry, summary judgment could not
be granted in favor of Beth Israel. 4 °
As the previous discussion points out, the growth of the AIDS
epidemic has engendered ethical and legal problems stemming from
the reluctance of some health care workers to treat HIV-positive
individuals. One means by which these individuals may vindicate
their rights is through section 504. Accumulated case law demon-
strates how courts have approached a cause of action alleging dis-
crimination on the basis of disability.
It is clear that an individual alleging a violation of his rights
under section 504 has a private cause of action and may seek money
damages. In situations involving health care providers, Medicare
and Medicaid payments constitute receipt of federal financial assis-
tance for the statute's purposes. Regarding the scope of section
504's coverage, the antidiscrimination prohibitions extend to an en-
tire institution if any part of it receives federal financial assistance.
However, coverage is limited to those programs or activities that ac-
tually receive the financial assistance.
Additionally, the doctrine of respondeat superior is applicable to a
section.504 cause of action. Therefore, a hospital may be vicariously
liable for the discriminatory acts of its physician-employees, and
under certain circumstances, for its physician-independent contrac-
tors. An individual who has been discriminated against on the basis
of his HIV-positive status may bring a section 504 cause of action,
since HIV-positive status qualifies as a handicap or disability under
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
339. Glanz, 756 F. Supp. at 638. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (quoting
Pushkin's standards regarding the burden of proof for § 504 actions).
340. Glanz, 756 F. Supp. at 639.
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the Act. However, one of the most important factors in determining
whether the plaintiff will be successful lies in the application of the
four-part Arline test to determine whether he is "otherwise" quali-
fied for participation in the federally funded program or activity. All
these factors are essential considerations in determining who may be
liable when a physician refuses to treat an HIV-positive patient.
II. ANALYSIS
This analysis addresses the areas of law previously discussed in
relation to a physician's refusal to continue treating an individual
because of that individual's HIV-positive status. Part A addresses
the situation's ethical aspects, and Part B addresses the mechanics
of bringing a cause of action under section 504. Part C then dis-
cusses the determination of who may bring'suit under the Act, and
the three elements involved in making that determination. Part D
addresses the cases and legislation which define the scope of section
504's coverage. Part E applies the theories of vicarious liability to
hospitals, while Part F addresses the doctrine of respondeat superior
as applied to section 504 actions. Part G discusses the Glanz v. Ver-
nick decision and addresses that court's interpretation of previous
case law as applied to the facts of the case. Finally, Part H applies
the analysis to two hypothetical situations involving a physician's
discrimination against an HIV-positive individual and a hospital's
potential liability for the physician's acts.
A. Issue of Whether There Is an Ethical Obligation to Treat
The AIDS epidemic has caused ethical and legal dilemmas of
enormous proportions. Although many medical associations have
stated that a physician has an ethical obligation to not refuse treat-
ment to an individual solely on the basis of his or her HIV-positive
status, some medical associations have refused to take this posi-
tion.341 The problem is exacerbated by the fact that, although the
risk of occupational infection is low, the risk still exists. 42 Addition-
ally, some health care workers may be at a greater risk of infection
because of their regular contact with patients' blood and body fluids,
341. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (quoting various medical associations' posi-
tions on the ethical duty to treat HIV-positive individuals).
342. See supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text (discussing the risk of occupational
infection).
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and common use of instruments that may cause cuts and punc-
tures. 343 In response to this increased risk, some health care workers
refuse to care for HIV-positive patients for fear of becoming in-
fected themselves.3" This puts HIV-positive individuals in a position
where they may be refused treatment that would normally be avail-
able to them if they were HIV-negative. Such discrimination im-
pacts the quality of care that an HIV-positive individual receives.
Moreover, this type of discrimination is unique and unlike discrimi-
nation on the basis of race, gender, or age. In certain situations,
health care workers do run a risk, although extremely slight, of con-
tracting a disease that may impact their employment, their families,
and their health.
Although some individuals may use this risk as a rationale to dis-
agree with statements pronouncing ethical obligations to treat, the
ultimate legal parameters of the duty to treat are set by the courts
through private causes of action brought by HIV-positive individu-
als alleging discrimination.
B. Bringing a Cause of Action under Section 504
A violation of section 504 occurs when an "otherwise qualified"
individual with a disability has been subjected to discrimination
under any program receiving federal financial assistance, solely on
the basis of his disability. 35 The courts, as discussed in Pushkin v.
Regents of the University of Colorado, have determined that a pri-
vate right of action exists under section 504.346 The Pushkin court
recognized that the purposes of Title VI and Title IX, and by anal-
ogy section 504, are "to avoid the use of federal resources to support
discriminatory practices" and "to provide individual citizens effec-
tive protection against those practices. 34 7 Therefore when an indi-
vidual has been discriminated against by a physician or hospital
which receives Medicare or Medicaid, a private right of action may
be essential to promote these purposes. HIV-positive individuals rely
upon hospitals and physicians for their health care. If such institu-
343. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (indicating that some health care workers
are at greater risk than others).
344. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons some health care
workers are refusing to care for AIDS patients).
345. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
346. 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981). See supra notes 109-27 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Pushkin).
347. Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1380.
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tions refuse to treat, it is imperative that HIV-positive individuals
use the protection afforded them by federal statute to help insure
access to the care they need to maintain the best quality and length
of life possible.
Support for a private cause of action can be found by applying
the Cort test348 to a section 504 plaintiff who has been discriminated
against on the basis of his HIV-positive status. First, the HIV-posi-
tive individual is a member of the class which the statute was in-
tended to benefit.3 49 An HIV-positive individual fits the description
of "individual with handicaps" in the regulations enacted pursuant
to section 504 since he has a "physical or mental impairment" as
defined in regulations adopted pursuant to the Act.350 These impair-
ments include physiological disorders of the hemic and lymphatic
systems, as well as many of the other listed disorders that occur in
the more advanced stages of AIDS. 5'
Second, there is an indication of legislative intent to create a pri-
vate remedy in such a situation.352 Congress amended the definition
of "individual with handicaps" to provide coverage for a maximum
number of individuals. 53 Congress indicated an intent to make this
remedy available to a wide range of disabled individuals by pattern-
ing section 504 after other antidiscrimination statutes with implied
rights of action. 54
Third, it is consistent with the purpose of the underlying legisla-
tive scheme to imply a private cause of action.3 55 Title VI, after
which section 504 was patterned, and Title IX sought to accomplish
two purposes: "to avoid the use of federal resources to support dis-
criminatory practices" and "to provide individual citizens effective
protection against those practices. '3 56 Therefore, by analogy, an
HIV-positive individual must have a private right of action under
section 504 in order to have effective protection against discrimina-
348. Id. at 1378 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)).
349. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (stating the first prong of the Cori test).
350. 45 C.F.R. § 84.36j)(2)(i)(A)-(B) (1991).
351. Id.
352. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (stating the second prong of the Cori test).
353. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative amendment of the
definition of "individual with handicaps" and Congress's purpose behind the amendment).
354. See supra text accompanying notes 121-24, 190 (discussing the relationship between Title
V1, Title IX, and § 504). See also supra text accompanying notes 109-17 (discussing the Pushkin
court's analysis of § 504's legislative history).
355. See Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Col., 658 F.2d 1372, 1378 (10th Cir. 1991).
356. Id. at 1380.
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tory practices. 57
The prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability is not
"traditionally relegated to state law." '358 Title VI and Title IX are
federal statutes that prohibit discrimination in federally funded pro-
grams. 359 Clearly, where HIV-positive individuals have been dis-
criminated against in the context of a federally funded program,
they could satisfy all the requirements of the Cort test.
The important issue of whether damages could be awarded to a
section 504 plaintiff was addressed in Miener v. Missouri.60 In de-
termining that a damage remedy was available to the plaintiff who
suffered from serious learning disabilities, the court extended a sub-
stantial means of redress to victims of handicap discrimination.3 61
The court looked at case law, legislative history, and the effective-
ness of other available remedies in its analysis. 362 The Miener court
recognized the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court that
where legal rights are invaded, and a federal statute provides a right
to sue, federal courts may use any available remedy to correct the
wrong. 63 As the Miener court recognized, administrative enforce-
ment remedies provided for by the Act are inadequate to vindicate
individual rights.364 This is an important factor when there has been
discrimination against an AIDS patient who brings suit under the
Act, but who may not have lived long enough for an injunctive rem-
edy to have any worth. Money damages may be the only means of
providing some compensation for the families of AIDS victims.
Such families are often stretched to the limit financially, physically,
and emotionally in trying to care for the dying individual. Addition-
ally, money damages may provide the only effective deterrent to dis-
criminatory practices.
C. Determining Who May Bring Suit under the Act
Three essential requirements must be met for a plaintiff to bring
357. Id.
358. See id. at 1378.
359. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text (stating that Title VI and Title IX pro-
hibit discrimination and create an implied right of action).
360. Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982).
See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text (discussing, the facts in the Meiner decision).
361. Id. at 978.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 977.
364. Id.
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suit under section 504: (1) the individual must be "handicapped"
within the meaning of the Act; (2) the individual must be "other-
wise qualified" within the meaning of the Act; and (3) the discrimi-
nation must occur within a federally funded program. 65 These re-
quirements will be addressed separately.
1. The Individual Must Be "Handicapped" within the Meaning of
the Act
Deciding whether an individual qualifies as disabled is a threshold
issue in determining who has standing to sue under the Act. It was
not until School Board v. Arlines" that the United States Supreme
Court extended the protection of the Rehabilitation Act to include
communicable diseases. Although the Court expressly declined to
decide the issue of whether HIV-positive persons could be consid-
ered disabled under the Act, the decision was nevertheless a signifi-
cant step towards applying the Act to HIV-positive individuals. 3 67
One important aspect of Arline is that the Court stated that a
contagious status does not remove an individual from coverage
under section 504.68 Rather, a contagious status figures into the
"otherwise qualified" determination that the court must make.369
This is an important step toward extending the protection of section
504 to those with HIV-positive status. Such individuals will remain
contagious as long as they are infected with the disease (i.e., for the
remainder of their lives). If the presence of a contagious state dis-
qualified individuals 'from coverage under the Act, then even the
smallest risk of contagion could provide a basis to exclude. Arline
makes it clear that an HIV-positive individual's contagious state will
not automatically result in exclusion, but instead will be taken into
consideration by the court in making an "otherwise qualified"
determination.
A second important aspect of Arline is its mandate that the "oth-
erwise qualified" inquiry should include individualized findings of
fact regarding four factors: a) the nature of the disease, b) the dura-
tion of the disease, c) the severity of the risk, and d) the probability
365. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (quoting the text of § 504).
366. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
367. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text (discussing Arline's significance in bring-
ing HIV-positive status within the Act's protection).
368. Arline, 480 U.S. at 285-86.
369. Id. at 286-87,.
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that the disease will be transmitted. 370 The application of these fac-
tors will allow the fact finder to determine whether the disabled in-
dividual is, in fact, otherwise qualified to participate in the program
or activity. For example, a determination that the severity of the
risk and the probability of transmission are both very high could
indicate that the individual is not otherwise qualified to participate.
However, if the severity of the risk is high but the probability of
transmission is low, as in the case of occupational exposure to HIV,
the individual may be deemed "otherwise qualified."
Although the Supreme Court expressly declined to include HIV
status as a disability under the Act, the following year a federal
appellate court applied the Arline concepts to HIV status in Chalk
v. United States District Court Central District of California.3 71
The Chalk decision is significant in that it expressly recognized
AIDS as a disability under section 504 of the Act.372 It is also sig-
nificant in applying Arline's "otherwise qualified" inquiry to HIV-
positive status. 73
2. The Individual Must Be "Otherwise Qualified" within the
Meaning of the Act
The Act prohibits discrimination against "otherwise qualified" in-
dividuals with disabilities, in programs or activities receiving federal
financial assistance. 74 In Arline, the Supreme Court stated that
courts should normally defer to the "reasonable medical judgments"
of public health officials in making "otherwise qualified" judg-
ments. 5 However, this sets up the paradox that was addressed in
Glanz v. Vernick, 'where the person making the "medical judg-
ments" is the alleged discriminator. 76 The Glanz court looked to
the opinion in Pushkin v. Regents of the University of Colorado3 77
to solve this dilemma. 378
The Pushkin court explained the appropriate approach regarding
370. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (quoting the Supreme Court's "otherwise qual-
ified" inquiry).
371. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
372. Id. at 704-05.
373. Id.
374. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988).
375. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987).
376. Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass. 1991). See supra notes 285-93 and accom-
panying text (discussing the facts of Glanz).
377. 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
378. Glanz, 756 F. Supp. at 638.
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the burden of proof. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie
case by showing that he was an otherwise qualified handicapped
person apart from his disability, and that he was rejected under cir-
cumstances which gave rise to the inference that his rejection was
based solely on his disability. 79 Once the plaintiff establishes this
prima facie case, the defendant has the burden of proving that the
plaintiff was not otherwise qualified, or in other words, one who is
able to meet all of the program's requirements in spite of his disabil-
ity. The defendant may also prevail by showing that the plaintiff's
rejection from the program was for reasons other than his disabil-
ity. 38 0 Finally, the plaintiff has the burden of rebuttal by presenting
evidence that the reasons articulated for the rejection, other than
the disability, encompass "unjustified consideration of the handicap
itself. ' 38 1 It is when the plaintiff shows that the rejection involves
"unjustified consideration" of the disability that he can overcome
the deference that would otherwise be accorded to the discriminat-
ing physician's medical determination.382 In an AIDS discrimination
situation, this could presumably be done by presenting expert wit-
ness evidence that reasonable accommodations could have been
made to allow the plaintiff to participate in the program or activity.
3. The Discrimination Must Occur within a Federally Funded
Program
Another important issue in fixing liability under the Act is deter-
mining which programs qualify as federally funded. The court in
United States v. Baylor University Medical Center found that a
hospital's receipt of Medicare and Medicaid payments triggered the
coverage of section 504. This decision has extremely important
ramifications for HIV-positive individuals. Most health care facili-
ties and individual physicians receive Medicare/Medicaid payments.
Therefore, most health care facilities and individual physicians may
be considered federally funded programs. By the nature of the dis-
ease, HIV-positive individuals and those with AIDS become ex-
tremely dependent on the health care community for quality and
379. Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981).
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. See supra notes 327-39 and accompanying text (discussing the approach taken in Glanz,
which balances deference to medical opinion with the detection of discriminatory motives).
383. 736 F.2d at 1039. See supra notes 178-88 and accompanying text (discussing Baylor).
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length of life. It is thus essential that these individuals have access
to quality health care. To deny them health care on the basis of
their HIV-status would contravene the purpose of section 504.
D. Defining the Scope of Section 504's Coverage
When an institution receives federal funding in the form of Medi-
caid and Medicare, an essential issue is the determination of
whether the institution is subjected to the prohibitions of section
504. In Grove City College v. Bell, the Supreme Court held that
because some of the students received federal assistance in the form
of BEOGs, 384 the college was a recipient of federal financial assis-
tance.3 85 However, the Court held that the students' receipt of aid
did not subject the whole college to the prohibitions of Title IX. 38'
Rather, only Grove City College's financial aid program was subject
to the prohibitions of Title IX.387 In other words, only the specific
program receiving the federal assistance was subject to the antidis-
crimination provisions. 88
Congress reacted to the Court's decision by amending the four
major civil rights statutes that prohibit discrimination in federally
assisted programs, including section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.3 189 Congress added a new section to each of these statutes to
make it clear that discrimination is prohibited throughout an entire
agency or institution if any part of the agency receives federal finan-
cial assistance.3 90 Therefore, the scope of section 504 and the other
amended statutes should no longer be interpreted as "program-
specific."
In the health care context, this means that if a hospital or clinic
receives Medicare or Medicaid payments in any one of its programs
or activities, the entire institution is subject to section 504's prohibi-
tions. 91 In other words, all the operations of the hospital are within
section 504's scope.
The Supreme Court again interpreted the scope of section 504 in
384. BEOG is the acronym for a Basic Educational Opportunity Grant.
385. 465 U.S. 555, 563-64 (1984).
386. Id. at 573.
387. Id. at 573-74.
388. Id.
389. S. REP. No. 64, supra note 206, at 2, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4.
390. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6.
391. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (stating pertinent parts of § 504 as amended
by the Civil Rights Restoration Act).
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United States Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans
of America, where it held that only those who actually receive fed-
eral financial assistance are subject to section 504.92 The Supreme
Court looked at the statute and found that by its language, section
504 limits its coverage to the "program or activity" that
"receiv[es]" the federal financial assistance."'3 The Court explained
that Congress sought to impose section 504 coverage as an obliga-
tion tied to the recipient's agreement to accept the federal funds.39 4
Additionally, the Court rejected the argument that the airlines were
"indirect recipients" of the aid to airports.3 9 In trying to clarify its
position, the Court distinguished intended beneficiaries from in-
tended recipients. 96 The Court acknowledged that in Grove City
College there was no distinction between direct and indirect aid.
However, it explained that these statements were made in the con-
text of determining whom Congress intended to receive the federal
money. 97
Several times in the opinion, the Court indicated that its ap-
proach, which differentiated between "intended recipients" and "in-
tended beneficiaries," reflected Congress's intent.3 98 However, later
that same year, Congress enacted the Air Carrier Access Act to
specifically prohibit air carriers from discriminating against disabled
individuals in the provision of air transportation. 99 As in the situa-
tion after Grove City College, Congress was taking action to expand
the coverage of the antidiscrimination provisions which the Supreme
Court had narrowed.
In the context of Medicaid and Medicare payments, both physi-
cians and hospitals may be interpreted as the intended recipients of
federal financial assistance. In a situation where a physician-em-
ployee treats a Medicare patient in a hospital setting, it can be ar-
gued that both the physician and the hospital are the intended recip-
ients, even if only one receives the Medicare or Medicaid payment
directly.
392. United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
393. Id. at 604.
394. Id. at 605.
395. Id. at 606.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. See supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between in-
tended recipients and intended beneficiaries).
399. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text -(explaining the Air Carrier Access Act
and a Senate report regarding the purpose of the statute).
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E. Applying Vicarious Liability to Hospitals
When a physician refuses to treat an HIV-positive individual in a
hospital setting, it is important to address the implications of the
doctrine of respondeat superior. Under that doctrine, the hospital
may be liable for the acts of a physician whom it employs when
such acts occur within the scope of the physician's employment.400
A hospital may also be liable for the acts of a physician who has
independent contractor status under the doctrine of apparent or os-
tensible agency.40' Ostensible agency will apply where the individual
patient looked to the hospital to provide him with medical treat-
ment, and where the hospital represented that its physicians would
provide that treatment.0 2
When an HIV-positive individual goes to a hospital and is re-
ferred to an independent contractor physician with whom the indi-
vidual had no prior relationship, a finding of ostensible agency will
depend on several factors: whether the individual dealing with the
physician believes that the physician is an agent of the hospital,
whether the belief is generated by some act on the part of the hospi-
tal, and whether or not the HIV-positive individual is guilty of
negligence.403
F. Applying the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior to Section 504
Actions
The district court in Patton had to decide whether vicarious lia-
bility could be applied to a section 504 suit. It found that the appli-
cation of respondeat superior would be consistent with the statute's
policy of eliminating discrimination against the disabled. "04 Such an
application would also create an incentive for the employer to exer-
cise care in the "selection, instruction and supervision of his employ-
ees."'4 5 The court stated that in the absence of a congressional di-
rective to the contrary, it would assume that Congress intended the
courts to use every available tool to eliminate discrimination against
400. See supra notes 249-59 and accompanying text (stating the principles of respondeat supe-
rior as applied to hospitals).
401. See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text (outlining the theory of ostensible agency).
402. See supra notes 261-75 and accompanying text (discussing instances in which ostensible
agency may be found).
403. Grewe v. Mt. Clemens Gen. Hosp., 273 N.W.2d at 434. See supra note 262-63 and ac-
companying text (stating the test for determining whether ostensible agency exists).
404. Patton v. Dumpson, 498 F. Supp. 933, 943 (1980).
405. Id.
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the disabled in federally funded programs.40 6
In the context of a hospital's vicarious liability for a physician's
acts, Patton's policy argument is particularly relevant. Holding a
hospital liable for a physician's discriminatory acts which violate
section 504 would create an incentive for the hospital to closely su-
pervise the activities of physicians dealing with HIV-positive indi-
viduals. This would encourage the hospital to develop policies for
treating HIV-positive patients and could potentially improve their
quality of care. Additionally, it would provide physicians with a
source of information and support regarding medical treatment for
HIV-positive patients. It would encourage a hospital to take discipli-
nary action when a physician's action did not comport with hospital
policy regarding HIV-positive individuals.
G. The Glanz Decision
The Massachusetts federal district court in Glanz v. Vernick was
faced with a situation where a physician, who was an employee of a
hospital, allegedly discriminated against a patient when he refused
to perform necessary ear surgery after learning that the patient was
HIV-positive. 0 7 The plaintiff, and later the plaintiff's estate,
brought suit alleging a violation of section 504.408 After finding that
the hospital was a recipient of federal funds because it received
Medicare and Medicaid payments, the court analyzed in detail the
Supreme Court's opinions in Grove City College and Paralyzed Vet-
erans to determine whether Dr. Vernick could be held personally
liable for allegedly discriminating against the plaintiff.4 0 9 The court
cited Grove City College for the proposition that application of the
antidiscrimination provisions of civil rights legislation for programs
receiving federal funding must be program-specific. 4 10 Therefore,
the court stated that the application of section 504 was to be "lim-
ited to the relevant program receiving the funds."'41 ' In this situa-
tion, the "relevant program" was the hospital's Ear, Nose and
Throat Clinic. Applying Paralyzed Veterans, the court reasoned
406. Id.
407. Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass. 1991). See supra notes 285-328 and accom-
panying text (discussing Glanz in depth),
408. Glanz, 756 F. Supp. at 634.
409. See supra notes 316-26 and accompanying text (discussing Glanz in conjunction with
Grove City College and Paralyzed Veterans).
410. Glanz, 756 F. Supp. at 637.
411. Id.
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that Dr. Vernick was an employee of the hospital and therefore did
not actually "receive" federal funds while working in that
capacity.412
In its analysis, the Glanz court applied an interpretation of sec-
tion 504 that is no longer appropriate since the enactment of the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987. 41 The court did not explain
its reasoning, but one possible explanation is that the discriminatory
act itself occurred before the passage of amendments that broad-
ened the scope of section 504.414 Once the court determined that
section 504's prohibitions were limited to the hospital's clinic, the
court felt that it could look no further to determine whether Dr.
Vernick was a recipient of federal funds. 15
However, the court acknowledged that Dr. Vernick participated
in another "program," the private medical practice in which he per-
sonally received federal funds for treating some patients.416 At
times, Dr. Vernick treated patients from his personal practice at the
hospital. 417 This practice fits within the Act's definition of a "pro-
gram or activity. ' 418 The amended Act defines a "program or activ-
ity" that receives federal funds as "all the operations of . . . an
entire . . . private organization or entire sole proprietorship . . .
principally engaged in the business of providing . . . health care
.. . any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance. 419
If the court had applied the broad coverage of the amended version
of section 504, the result would have been that section 504's cover-
age was no longer program-specific. Therefore, since Dr. Vernick's
practice fit the definition of program or activity, and since he re-
ceived federal funds in one program (his own private practice), he
would be subject to the statute. This is so even though he did not
directly receive federal funding in the context of his employment at
412. See supra notes 209-26 and accompanying text (discussing Paralyzed Veterans and the
Supreme Court's holding that only those who actually receive federal funds are subject to § 504's
coverage).
413. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text (discussing the Civil Rights Restoration
Act).
414. See supra note 316 (discussing the time frame of the discriminatory act and passage of
the amendment to § 504).
415. Glanz, 756 F. Supp. at 637.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (stating the definition of "program or
activity").
419. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text (discussing the
broad coverage of § 504 as amended by the Civil Rights Restoration Act).
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the hospital.
The Glanz court went on to find that even though Dr. Vernick
was not liable under the statute, the hospital could still be held vi-
cariously liable if it exercised power or control over the professional
conduct of the physician. 20 The court found various factors indicat-
ing the requisite control was present and held that the hospital could
be held liable for Dr. Vernick's actions based on respondeat supe-
rior."2" This result is problematic since many cases cite the common
law principle that an employer is freed from any liability based on
the employee's actions if the court finds that the employee is not
liable."2 According to this principle, once Dr. Vernick was found
not liable under the statute, the hospital could not be held vicari-
ously liable.
A second problem related to holding the hospital, but not the phy-
sician, liable is that it relieves the physician of liability even though
he discriminated against an HIV-positive patient. According to the
dissenting opinion in Paralyzed Veterans, the question should be
whether the physician is "in a position to 'exclud[e handicapped
persons] from the participation in, . . . den[y them] the benefits of,
• ..or subjec[t them] to discrimination under' a program or activ-
ity receiving federal financial assistance."'423 It is the physician who
is in a position to deny treatment to the HIV-disabled individual.
Under the dissent's rationale, the physician himself is the "pro-
gram" that should be subject to section 504's prohibitions.
Another factor to consider is that the majority in Paralyzed Vet-
erans strongly emphasized the difference between "recipients" and
"beneficiaries" and stated that the statute's prohibitions were lim-
ited to Congress's "intended recipients" of federal funds. 24 Here,
both physicians and hospitals are the intended recipients of Medi-
care and Medicaid payments.
In summary, a more equitable result would be obtained in this
situation if physicians were held personally liable for their discrimi-
natory acts. This would remove the inconsistency of holding the hos-
420. Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632, 636 (D. Mass. 1991)
421. See supra notes 303-07 and accompanying text (discussing the factors dispositive for the
court in finding vicarious liability).
422. See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text (stating the effect of an employee's non-
liability upon vicarious liability of the employer).
423. United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 614 (1986)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
424. Id. at 606-07.
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pital, but not the physician, liable under section 504.
I. Applying the Analysis to Hypothetical Situations
Incorporating the previous analysis, the following sections of this
Comment address two hypothetical situations where, in a hospital
setting, a physician refuses to continue treating an HIV-positive
individual.
1. Hypothetical Involving a Physician-Employee
In the first scenario, the physician is an employee of the hospital
and has no independent practice of his own. He receives no Medi-
care or Medicaid payment for his work but simply receives a salary
from the hospital. An HIV-positive patient comes to the hospital or
clinic for treatment and is referred to the physician. The patient and
the physician have no previous relationship independent of the
hospital.
In this situation, the physician does not fit section 504's definition
of "program or activity. ' 425 Since he has no independent practice
and is simply an employee, he is not a corporation, partnership, pri-
vate organization, or sole proprietorship. Additionally, he does not
"receive" federal funding in the form of Medicaid or Medicare."2" It
is doubtful whether he would be held liable under the Act.
However, it could be argued that the hospital should be held di-
rectly (not vicariously) liable for allowing its employee to act in a
discriminatory manner towards an HIV-positive patient who was
treated in the hospital's facilities. The hospital itself would fit the
definition of "program or activity" and would be a recipient of fed-
eral funds since it receives the Medicare or Medicaid directly.4 27
2. Hypothetical Involving a Physician-Independent Contractor
In the second scenario, the physician is not an employee of the
hospital, but instead has independent contractor status. As in the
first hypothetical, the HIV-positive individual comes to the hospital
or clinic seeking treatment and is referred to the physician. The
425. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (stating the definition of "program or activity").
426. See supra notes 178-88 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale for finding that
Medicare and Medicaid constitute federal financial assistance).
427. See supra notes 81 and 180 and accompanying text (defining "program or activity" and
stating that Medicare and Medicaid constitute federal financial assistance).
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physician refuses to treat him after determining his HIV-positive
status.
In a situation where the physician receives the Medicare or Medi-
caid payments himself, he would clearly be the recipient of federal
funding and would be within the scope of section 504.28 The court
should consider various factors to determine whether the physician
has independent contractor status, or whether the hospital exerts
such control that vicarious liability would be appropriate.429 Factors
indicating control include instances where the hospital: determines
the physician's schedule; establishes policies and procedures to be
followed by the physician; pays the physician's wages, provides
equipment, supplies, and office space; and bills patients for the phy-
sician's services.430
However, even if the physician is found to have independent con-
tractor status, the hospital may still be held liable under the theory
of ostensible agency. Ostensible agency applies where the hospital
"holds out" to patients that physicians associated with it are its em-
ployees, or where the hospital "holds out" to its patients that it is a
provider of medical services, and the patient goes to that hospital
relying on it to deliver those medical services.4 31 The Glanz court
stated that, because of the policy discussed in Patton, it would be
appropriate to hold a hospital responsible for the actions of its medi-
cal staff regarding compliance with the Act, even without a finding
of power or control. 4 2 This further suggests that independent con-
tractor status will not necessarily preclude a hospital's liability for
the acts of its physicians.
CONCLUSION
Persons who test HIV-positive are disabled persons protected by
the nondiscrimination prohibitions of section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act.433 Most public and private health care providers in the
428. See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 605
(1986) (holding that § 504's coverage is limited to those who actually receive federal financial
assistance).
429. Hodson, supra note 249, at 245.
430. See supra note 251-59 and accompanying text (discussing factors the court considers in
assessing whether a hospital may be liable for the negligence of a physician functioning as an
independent contractor).
431. See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of ostensible
agency).
432. Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632, 636-37 (D. Mass. 1991).
433. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
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United States are recipients of federal financial assistance in the
form of Medicare and Medicaid. As such, they are prohibited from
discriminating against persons who have the AIDS virus. Refusal to
provide health care services to such individuals violates the antidis-
crimination guarantees of section 504.
However, in demanding equal treatment for HIV-positive individ-
uals, the courts are dealing with a situation that some health care
providers view as jeopardizing not only their livelihoods, but also
their lives. It will take time and education to successfully ensure
nondiscriminatory treatment for all HIV-positive individuals.
Nancy A. Moore

